Data protection within the cloud: lessons for the new African data protection regime from the European data protection framework. by Mbabu, Oscar Koome
\, i
, I )
DATA PROTECTION WITHIN THE CLOUD:
LESSONS FOR THE NEW AFRICAN DATA
PROTECTION REGIME FROM THE EUROPEAN
DATA PROTECTION FRAMEWORK.
OSCAR KOOME MBABU
DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL





DATA PROTECTION WITHIN THE. CLOUD: LESSONS FOR THE NEW AFRICAN
DATA PROTECTION REGIME FROM THE EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION
FRAMEWORK.




STUDENT'S NAME: OSCAR KOOME MBABU
STUDENT'S REGISTRATION NUMBER: n48:i
SIGNATURE OF STUDENT: I o/1A;~~~
L








·1 DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY:
I declare herewith , that this above-mentioned dissertation is my own original work. Furthermore,
I confirm that: this work has been composed by me without assistance; I have clearly referenced
in accordance with departmental requirements, in both the text and the bibliography or
references, all sources (either from a printed source, internet or any other source) used in the
work; - all data and findings in the work have not been falsified or embellished; this work has
not been previously, or concurrently, used either for other courses or within other exam
processes as an exam work; and that this work ha J.e~en.~ished .






I would like to appreciate the effort and sacrifice shown by my dear mother, Ms. Jane Kathure
Ikunyua-Mbabu, whose diligence and undying love has strengthened me during the most
tumultuous times of my academic life, and Mr. Lawrence Murithi Mbabu, my father, who has
taught me the invaluable lesson that knowledge is power. Finally, I would like to acknowledge
my younger brother, Dennis Muriungi Mbabu, I hope he strives to achieve greatness, twice as




! List of abbreviations:
1. A29WP: Article 29 Working Party
2. AU: African Union.
3. DPD: Data Protection Directive
4. EU: European Union
5. FSA: Financial Services Authority.
6. IaaS: Infrastructure as a Service
7. PaaS: Platform as a Service
8. PNC : Police National Computer
9. SaaS: Software as a Service






A. European Court Cases:
1. Bodil Lindqvist ,Case 101/01, [2004] QB 1014
2. Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers [2004] UKHL 22 on appeal from [2002] EWCA
Civ 1373 and [2002] EWHC 499 (QB).
3. Douglas v Hello [2007] UKHL 21 on appeal from [2005] EWCA Civ 106 and [2005]
EWCA Civ 595, [2005] EWCA Civ 861.
4. Osterreichischer RundfunkJoined Cases C-465/00, C-138/01 ,. and C-139/01 [2003]
ECR 1-4989.
5. Durant v Financial Services Authority [2003] EWCA Civ 1746.
6. Scottish Information Commissioner v Common Services Agency [2008] UKHL 47.
7. Common Services Agency v Scottish Information Commissioner [2008] UKHL 47.
8. Volker und Markus Schecke (Approximation oflaws) OJ C 13/6. Joined Cases C-92/09
and C-93/09 .
9. Innovations (Mail Order) v Data Protection Registrar, Case DA/92, available from
http://www.infonnationtribunal.gov.uk/DBFiles/Decision/i 163/innovations.pdf
10. Johnson v Medical Def ence Union. [2007] EWCA Civ 262.
11. CCN Systems v Data Protection Registrar, [2006] EWHC 321 (Ch) Available from
http://www.informationtribunal.gov.uk/Documents/decisions/Clm systems.pdf
12. Linguaphone Institute v Data Protection Registrar, Case DA/94 31/49/1
13. The Chief Constables of West Yorksh ire, South Yorkshire and North Wales Police and
the Information Commissioner Available from
http://www.informationtribunal.gov.uk/DBFiles/Decision/i204/riorth wales police.pdf







B. Kenyan Court Cases :
1. Benard Murage v. Fineserve Africa Limited and Four Others (Petition No. 503 of
2014)
2. Kipkalya Kones v Republic & Another exparte Kimani Wanyoike & 4 Others (2008) 3
KLR (EP) 291,
3. Francis Gitau Parsimei & 2 Others v National Alliance Party & 4 Others (Petition
No.35 6 and 359 of 2012)
4. Speaker ofNational Assembly v Njenga Karume [2008] 1 KLR 425,
5. Damian Belfonte v The Attorney General ofTrinidad and Tobago C.A 84 of2004,
6. Harrikinson v Attorney General ofTrinidad and Tobago [1980] AC 265.
7. Wananchi Group (Kenya) Ltd v The Communications Commission ofKenya (Petition
No.980f2012)
8. Isaac Ngugi v Nairobi Hosp ital and Another (Petition No.46 1 of2012)
9. Kennedy vs Ireland (1987) I.R 587
10. Republic v The Council ofLegal Education ex parte James Njuguna and 14 Others,





The digital wave has finally hit Africa , and its effect upon the African economy has been
immensely positive. With the development of innovative products such as Safaricom's M-Pesa
money transfer service, as well as iCow, a farming digital product that has optimized dairy
farmers' productivity, the consumer market has developed an appetite for sound, data-centric
solutions in order to enhance the various socio-economic activities present within the Continent.
At the centre of the immense adoption of emergent technologies by the African populace is one
of the most valuable resources present in the current technology era; data. The latter enables the
adoption and execution of innovative strategies by multinational companies in order to minimise
costs and maximise profits. Moreover, the widespread use of Big Data technologies and the
incorporation of data into corporate strategies enables efficient market segmentation as solutions
are tailor-made to suit specified clientele according to their needs. The latter leads to products
that effectively lead to technological leaps and contribute immensely in terms of trickle-down
benefits to the larger society. This could go a long way in combating familiar foes of African
development such as ignorance (through educational platforms, such as Coursera), disease
(through healthcare solutions such as HelloDoctor) and poverty (the kuhustle.co.ke application
has enabled the provision of on-demand software services to the public through a bidding
process, leading to access of cheaper affordable services for customers, while generating revenue
for the biddee).
. .~
Despite the monumental opportunities presented by the advent of emergent technologies,
specifically cloud technologies whose proliferation in Africa is abundant, the African Union 's
member states remain largely unprepared for the data presence within their jurisdictions. Only
seven out of fifty-four African States have a working data protection policy, while the mobile
phone industry continues to post sales of upto 50million units per year within the African market.
The exposure to the violation of consumer rights as well as privacy rights guaranteed by the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights is immense for citizens of African States .
This paper intends to analyse the various data protection principles sourced from the European
Union, whilst juxtaposing it with the present African data protection regime, insofar as the recent
adoption of the African Union's Convention on Cybercrime and Personal Data Regulation is
concerned. This paper will also critically analyse the encounter between an emergent, cloud-
based technology and the Kenyan jurisdiction, in the case of Bernard Murage v. Fineserve
Kenya Limited & Three Others, in order to understand the state of Kenya's data protection
standing in the current crisis. Finally, this paper will give the author's humble recommendations
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CHAPTER ONE: RESEARCH PROPOSAL.
Introduction:
Cloud computing, in its simplest definition, can be defined as a way of delivering .computing
resources as a utility service via a network, typically the Internet, scalable up and down
according to user requirements.' As such, the cloud may prove to be as disruptive an innovation
as was the emergence of cheap electricity on demand centuries ago. Such computing resources
may range from raw processing power and storage, such as servers or storage equipment, to full
software applications. Users can rent IT resources from third parties when needed, instead of
purchasing their own, thus "turning capex into opex" (turning capital expenditure into operating
expenditure). The latter, particularly in Africa has been fundamental in the adoption and
proliferation of cloud services within its populace.
At the heart of the technical development of cloud technology, however, lies the true benefit of
its implementation within modem society, a resource of our time whose wise ' utilisation
continues to leapfrog human advancement in new and fantastic ways; data. Data is the lifeblood
of technological innovation in the modem society, as it enables manufacturers to actively assess
market needs, to wisely invest funds in the fulfilment of viable solutions and finally to fulfil
those needs in a profit-maximised manner. The utility of these products by the public ultimately
carry significant trickle-down benefits as the efficiency of numerous service and product
providers are boosted tremendously by the adoption of these technologies, which ultimately
impact the society as a whole through the enjoyment of better products and services.' The value
chain of data, and its ability to maximise business profitability has led to the development and
widespread adoption of data mining and analytics by local and multinational companies alike.
Moreover, the highly disruptive nature of the implementation of data-centric business strategies
has motivated firms to adopt and utilise the power ofdata in order to provide innovative Sand
1 Millard Christopher; Cloud Computing Law, Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, United
Kingdom, 2013 ,p. 1.
2http : //webca ch e .goog l euserco ntent. com/sea rch ?q =cach e : h tt p : //www. l a its . u texas . ed u /~no rman/BUS . FO R/cou rs
e.mat/Alex According to research on data mining in the University of Austin, Texas, data-centric business models




") wholesome solutions in accordance with their consumers' tastes (who have developed a rather
discerning appetite) or face elimination by competitors who have adopted proper digital
strategies in order to fulfil such market needs. This notion was particularly well-captured by John
Chambers, former CEO of Cisco Systems Inc, when he stated that , according to research carried
out by his company, only 40% of current global businesses today would survive the data-centric
digital revolution that was occurring in the modern age. All companies alike , according to
Cisco 's findings, are thus faced with a stark ultimatum; to either disrupt or get disrupted.'
Despite the various socio-economic benefits attached to the utilisation of data as a resource , the
practice of data mining and data analytics poses significant questions regarding the constitutional
rights and freedoms accorded to individuals from whom this data is derived. In achieving the
immense potential which data possesses, analysing and mining data indiscernibly could lead to
notable violations of the constitutional right to privacy, as well as the consumer rights of
protection against undue economic exploitation by producers. There is thus, a necessity to
protect and legislate for the need to differentiate, collect and process data from numerous
individuals by data processors in a transparent and equitable maimer. Thus , the function of data
protection law in the modern society can be seen to be the fundamental role of establishing a
balance between the commercial needs of various data-centric operations in modern-day
corporate establishments while protecting the fundamental rights and freedoms of various
individuals as guaranteed by each jurisdiction's Constitution.
JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY:
Centrally, the justification of this study is founded upon the significant integration of cloud-
based technologies into the social, economic and political activities of African individuals in the
modern society. The proliferation of cloud-based technologies within the African populace has
been fuelled by certain economic and infrastructural realities affecting numerous States in the
continent.
3 John Chambers' final key note address in Cisco Live 2015, asserted the numerous points made in this paragraph.




", The first of these is the vast broadband coverage within the region. About 87% of the African
region has broadband connectivity, thus enabling the adoption of new mobile technologies at an
accelerated pace." Fundamentally, the latter is influenced by another reality; this regards the
price and availability of mobile devices within Africa. According to UNDP, lout of every 3
Africans has a mobile phone. The latter is due to the introduction of cheaper versions of mobile
devices by prominent mobile technology manufacturers such as Apple, .Samsung and Huawei ;
whose shrewd business strategies have enabled Africans to enjoy the utility benefits of
technology at a reduced cost. In a survey carried out by The Guardian, the current trend of the
consumption of mobile technologies within the African populace is only the beginning, as the
rate of mobile consumers is expected to rise twenty-fold in the next five years, with the rise of
internet-based services continuing at a similar trend .'
Economically, the impact of cloud-based technologies run on mobile devices is tremendous,
particularly within the Kenyan jurisdiction. This situation is best illustrated by the immense
success story of the M-PESA mobile money transfer service. This award-winning product is run
by the Nairobi-based Safaricom Company. Nearly a decade after its launch , M-PESA has
transformed economic interaction in Kenya. Its success reshaped Kenya's banking and telecom
sectors, extended financial inclusion for nearly 20 million Kenyans , and facilitated the creation
of thousands of small businesses. M-PESA has been especially successful in reaching low-
income Kenyans: new data indicates that the percentage of people living on less than $1.25 a day
who use M-PESA rose from less than 20 percent in 2008 to 72 percent by 2015. Groups that
typically have limited access to formal financial services have benefited from the financial
products offered through M-PESA. In particular, its short-term Pay Bill Account service allows
users to fundraise for a variety of purposes, including expenses relating to medical needs,
education, and disaster relief.6 M-PESA has also empowered business creation-many small
companies rely on M-PESA for nearly all transactions, or provide a service that is a derivative of
the platform itself. This has significantly empowered the SME economy.which is the economic
4 Erick Hersman ,iHub, Mobile Technologies in Africa (2013)
Shttp://www.vodafone.com!business!global-enterprise!invisible-infrastructure-the-rise-of-africas-mobile-middle-
class-2013-08-22 (Accessed on 5/11/2015)







backbone of the Republic of Kenya. Socially, cloud-based technologies have taken centre stage
in the global and local digital market , social networking platforms such as Twitter, Whatsapp,
Facebook and Instagram are part and parcel of the social undertakings of the metropolitan and
rural populace, who seek to communicate and interact with each oth~r through the internet.
Subsequently, the social aspects of technology have enabled a growth in the political
participation of citizens in African States, particularly among the youth who have been exposed
to multiple world views, as well as global news, courtesy of the Intcrnet' An interesting political
consequence of the adoption of these technologies is the ability accorded to the public that
enables it to publicly scrutinise government activities and reward such actors with positive
feedback that enables the regime 's agenda, or with politically scathing negative feedback
regarding the regime 's institutional or systemic failures in the provision of public services to Her
people. Bearing in mind the history of corruption and malpractice in Africa, teclmology's
contribution to the emancipation of the public from the oppression by State kingpins may have
played a fundamental role in its widespread adoption in the continent's society."
With the growth of cloud users throughout the Continent comes the inevitable generation of
petabytes of data regarding the personal relationships and commercial undertakings of billions of
African users. Hidden within this data, is the immense opportunity to improve the standard of
life of the largely impoverished African populace, as well as data-centric solutions to numerous
economic problems faced by the various regions of Africa, such as drought, famine, disease ,
illiteracy and poor governance. However, there also exists an impending threat to the national
security of States, on account of this growth of data presence within Africa. Personal data
regarding the growing number of data subjects across the Continent could be used to harm the
individuals themselves in agonising ways. As the digitisation of products and services grows, the
users of such services submit sensitive information, regarding their health , lifestyles and business
transactions, which when leaked or made public could inflict great harm to the reputation ,
economic relationship or overall health of the person so involved. Moreover, with the rise of
7htt p://www.theguardian.com!technology!2011! jul!24! mobile-phones-africa-microfinance-farming(Accessed on
5/11/2015) .





.0) radicalism and terrorism in the 215t Century, terrorists may be able to set out elaborate schemes
in order to wreak havoc on States, based on intelligence derived from unprotected data sources.
Deficiencies in legislation regarding data protection may also perpetuate cybercrime, as
criminals seek to exploit cloud infrastructure to create international platforms that provide illegal
products and services such as child pornography, transborder money transfers and payment
schemes for the trafficking of illegal goods. Nature abhors a vacuum, and according to recent
research carried out by the International Telecommunication Union, African legislators seem
largely unprepared for the numerous threats that data abundance poses to their sovereignty and
national security.
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM:
Within European jurisdictions, legislation has played the essential role of safeguarding the data
of their citizens through various elaborate mechanisms. The assessment of these legislative
safeguards could help design viable and innovative legal solutions to the miasma of conflict
which data integrity in the cloud could be for African courts.
The enactment of the African Union's Convention on Cybercrime and Personal Data Protection
may seem to remedy numerous data protection concerns , but the question remains as to whether
the Convention anticipated the development of cloud technology and its proliferation in Africa.
If not, the latter could prove to be one of the largest hindrances to the growth of e-commerce and
foreign investment in emerging African businesses.
The widespread use of indigenous cloud-based technologies, such as Sportpesa and M-Pesa
within the Kenyan jurisdiction could lead to differentiated and unique legal considerations as
regards their use by Kenyan citizens. It is crucial that Kenyan legislation offer guidance
regarding the numerous legal risks posed by such technologies, as failure to do so will constitute
a breach of the Kenyan Constitution of 2010, which necessitates the ardent protection of




") STATEMENT OF THE OBJECTIVES:
This paper will endeavour to achieve the following objectives:
• This paper will seek to investigate the numerous global standards which govern the
collection and use of personal data in the cloud, in order to incorporate such tenets into
the Kenyan jurisdiction's practices.
• The paper will objectively analyse the European Union's Data Protection regime in order
to infer any favourable data protection regulations which could further supplement the
African Union Convention on Cybercrime and Personal Data Protection and vice versa.
• This paper will look into the Kenyan regulations on data protection and will seek to
analyse whether the global standards of data protection, such as the GECD Guidelines on
Data Protection have been incorporated into local statutes, as well as the principles
proposed by the African Union Convention on Cybercrime and Pe~sonal Data Protection.
This paper will seek to make appropriate recommendations regarding the data protection
regime in Kenya , in accordance with its findings and research.
'.'
AN INTRODUCTION TO DATA PROTECTION: THE CONCEPT OF PROCESSING
AND DATA PROTECTION ACTORS:
1. The concept of processing:
Much of what has been said above is predicated on the notion that data is processed. It is now
appropriate to consider what forms of activity can be classed as constituting processing. The
European Data Protection Directive provides here that processing includes any operation or set
of operations which is performed upon personal data, whether or not by.automatic means, such




\} use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available", alignment or
combination, blocking, erasure or destruction. 10
The United Kingdom 1998 Data Protection Act's definition differs slightly in terminology,
largely because of the need to make separate provision for the treatment of non-automated or
manual processing. I I It provides that 'processing' , in relation to infor.mation or data, means
obtaining, recording or holding the information or data or carrying out any operation or set of
operations on the information or data, including organisation, adaptation or alteration of the
information or data; retrieval , consultation or use of the information or data; disclosure of the
information or data by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available; or alignment,
combination, blocking, erasure or destruction of the information or data. 12 Linked to this is a
definition of the word data, as:
... is being processed by means ofequipment operating automatically in response to instructions
given for that purpose; (b) is recorded with the intention that it should be processed by means of
such equipment; or (c) is recorded as part ofa relevant fi ling system or with the intention that it
shouldform part ofa relevant filing system. /3
The term 'relevant filing system' is designed to extend the legislation to certain forms of manual
filing systems and will be considered separately below. It will be noted that the scope of the
definition is extremely broad. It might be suggested , with little element of exaggeration, that
whilst the act of dreaming about data will not constitute processing, any further activities will
bring a party within the scope of the legislation.!" Although not yet at issue before a United
Kingdom court , the question of what acts constitute processing was raised before the European
Court in Bodil Lindqvist.? An initial issue concerned the question of whether the mention of a
,
-·i
9 Lloyd. J. Ian, Information Technology Law, Sixth Edition. published in Oxford University Press (2012), Great
Clarendon Street, United Kingdom, p. 49
10 Article 2(b), Data Protection Directive, 95/46/EC
llLloyd. J. Ian, Information Technology Law, Sixth Edition, p.49
12 Section 1(1), The United Kingdom Data Protection Act,1998.
13Section 1(1), The United Kingdom Data Protection Act,1998.
14L1 oyd. J. Ian, Information Technology Law, Sixth Edition, p.49




(1 person on a web page constituted processing of personal data as defined in the Data Protection
Directive. 16 Two issues arose in this context: first , whether the data on Mrs Lindqvist's web page
included personal data. The court's reply was unequivocal:
The term undoubtedly covers the name ofa person in conjunction with his telephone coordinates
or information about his working conditions or hobbies.17
Equally clear was the court's determination that processing had taken place. The Swedish
government argued for a broad approach, suggesting that 'as soon as personal data are processed
by computer, whether using a word-processing programme or in order to put them on an Internet
page, they have been the subject of processing'. Although Counsel for Mrs Lindqvist argued that
something more was needed beyond compilation of what was effectively a word-processed
document and that only metatags and other technical means used to assist with the compilation
of indexes and retrieval of information would suffice, the court agreed with the Swedish
government's submission:
According to the definition in Article 2(b) ofDirective 95/46, the term processing of such data
used in Article 3(1) covers any operation or set ofoperations which is performed upon personal
data, whether or not by automatic means. 18
Although all forms of processing are potentially covered by the Data Protection Directive.l" the
most stringent controls apply in the case of processing by automatic means. It is arguable that
any use of a computer to create a document comes within the scope of this criterion, as there is
no direct physical link between the author pressing a key and a letter or symbol appearing on the
screen. The act of loading a page onto a web server involved a number of operations, some at
least of which are performed automatically.
16 Directive 95/46/EU








2. Data Protection Actors:
A Data Controllers:
Data controllers are subject to the most extensive forms of control under the Data Protection Act
and Directive . The Directive provides that : ' controller' shall mean the natural or legal person ,
public authority, agency or any other body which alone or jointly with others determines the
purposes and means of the processing of personal data; where the purposes and means of
processing are determined by national or Community laws or regulations, the controller or the
specific criteria for his nomination may be designated by national or Community law.2° The Data
Protection Act provides that a party will be classed as a data controller when it: , . . (either alone
or jointly or in common with other persons) determines the purposes for which and the manner
in which personal data are, or are to be processed."
In the case where data are processed only for purposes required by statute, for example the
compilation of an electoral roll , the agency charged with conducting the work will be classed as
the data controller.f The key element of the above definitions relates , with the exception of the
performance of statutory functions, to the ability to ' determine the nature and extent of the
processing which is to be carried out It is quite possible for persons to be classed as data
controllers even though they do not own a computer. An example might concern the owner of a
small business who records details of transactions on pieces of paper which are stored in the
archetypal shoebox. Once a year, the shoebox may be collected by an accountant, who transfers
the data to computer in order to prepare a set of accounts/", Assuming that some of the data in
the accounts relate to individual creditors and debtors, all the criteria necessary for the
application of the legislation will be satisfied and, doubtless much to their surprise, the business
person will be classed as a data controller. In such a situation, the accountant will also be so
regarded, the Divisional Court confirming in Data Protection Registrar v Griffin /" a case
brought under the Data Protection Act 1984, that anyone who processed data on behalf of clients
20 Article 2(d), Data Protection Directive, 95/46/EU.
21 Section 1(1), United Kingdom's Data Protection Act, 1998.
22Uoyd. J. Ian, Information Technology Law, Sixth Edition, p.51
23Uoyd. J. Ian, Information Technology Law, Sixth Edition, p.52




' 7 would be regarded as a data user (now controller) when he or she possessed any control or
discretion concerning the manner in which the processing was carried out. A similar result is
postulated in the Recitals to the Data Protection Directive:
. . . where a message containing personal data is transmitted by means ofa telecommunications
or electronic mail service, the sole purpose ofwhich is the transmission ofsuch messages, the
controller in respect of the personal data contained in the message will normally be considered
to be the person from whom the message originates, rather than the person offering the
transmission services; whereas, nevertheless, those offering such services will normally be
considered controllers in respect ofthe processing ofthe additional personal data necessary for
the operation ofthe service. 25
B. Data Processors:
As in the example given above, some data controllers may seek to have processing carried out on
their behalf by a third party. This was perhaps more prevalent in the early days of computing
than is the case today, although one aspect which remains significant is where undertakings
make arrangements as part of a disaster recovery plan, to obtain access to external processing
facilities in the event of some interruption to service.i" Mirroring once again the terminology of
the Data Protection Directive.i" the Data Protection Act 1998 utilises the term 'data processor'
which encompasses:
. .. any person (other than an employee ofthe data controller) who processes the data on behalf
ofthe data controller.28
The phrase in brackets was included to avoid the possibility that employees engaged in
processing in the course of their employment might be regarded as data processors. Given the
expanded definition of processing adopted in the 1998 Act, it will be the case that any other
25Directive 95/46/EC, Recital 41.
26Uoyd. J. Ian, Information Technology Law, Sixth Edition, p.51
27 Directive 95/46/EC.




,) person who collects data for the controller, perhaps by conducting market research surveys using
pen and paper, will be classed as a processor. Although a wide range of persons may be classed
as data processors , the requirements imposed on them are limited . Data processors will not be
subject to the notification requirements, 29 whilst, in respect of the requirement to maintain
appropriate security (now found in the seventh principle), the onus is placed upon the data
controller for whom processing is conducted. The controller is responsible for selecting a
processor who can provide satisfactory guarantees regarding security. A written contract must
also be entered into obliging the processor to act only on instructions from the controller in
respect of the processing carried out, and also to comply with the requirements of the seventh
principle.r'Further, it is only the data controller who may be liable to compensate data subjects
for losses arising from processing.t'
C. Data Subjects:
A data subject is 'an individual who is the subject of personal data' .32 It would be a unique
individual who is not to be classed as a data subject many times over. In contrast to the situation
,\ with data controllers and processors, where the focus is very much on the obligations imposed
under the legislation, for data subjects, the purpose of the statute is to confer rights. The most
important right for data subjects is undoubtedly that of obtaining access to data held by
controllers and of securing the correction of any errors contained therein."
Research methodology;
29Section 17, which provides for notification, refers only to this obligation being imposed upon data controllers, UK
Data Protection Act'
30Scheduie 1, Pt. 2, para. 12, UK Data Protection Act.
31Section 13
32Section 1(1). Section 1(4) contains the equivalent provision in the Data Protection Act 1984.




f'-I During the duration of my research, I will use the following items in order to achieve the
numerous objectives set by this proposal:
• Published articles
• Journals
Stellar dissertations, theses and relevant academic material
Chapter Breakdown:
In order to properly fulfil the objectives set out in this paper, the material will thusly be ordered
into the following criteria:
1. Chapter One: Research Proposal.
This will involve the background to the problem, a statement of the problem, and the research
objectives set out to be fulfilled by this paper. Further, this chapter will enumerate on the
numerous working concepts and definitions and terms as selected by the author in the
construction of this paper.
2. Chapter Two: Fundamental concepts and theories regarding Cloud Computing and
the Emergence of data protection policy in the global digital m'arket:
This chapter will deal with the introduction to fundamental technical aspects of cloud computing
and its impact upon the legislation of the cloud deployment practice digital market. The second
chapter will also outline the emergence of data protection regulation in modem society , as a
historical approach to the subject is essential to determining as to whether data protection fulfils
the roles it is meant to in society today, or whether it has failed in legislating against data-centric
innovations such as cloud technology.
3. Chapter Three: Data Protection Derived From The European Union And Their




;,-'j This chapter will entail detailed insights into the various principles and tenets of data protection
regulation within Europe, with a focus on the jurisprudence and statutes sourcing from the
United Kingdom. The latter has been selected as a point of emphasis by the author as it is the
cradle of the common law, and has immense influence in the development of legislation and
ratio descedendi in other common law jurisdictions such as Kenya . The outcome of this chapter
is to successfully eke out the essential concepts of data protection regulation in these
jurisdictions in order to juxtapose them in relation to Kenyan data protection regulation.
4. Chapter Four: Analysing The Present Data Protection Framework Within The
Kenyan Jurisdiction Through The Constitution, Kenvan Jurisprudence And The
African Union Convention On Personal Data Protection And Cvbersecuritv:
This chapter will investigate current data protection regulation within Kenya , while referring to
the principles present in the African Union Convention Regarding Personal Data Protection and
Cybersecurity. This will enable a concrete comparison with the European data protection regime,
and will ultimately reveal the gaps that African legislation has! has not anticipated , in
comparison with the European data protection regime. This chapter may .also highlight the areas
that the African legislation has surpassed European and English jurisprudence.
5. Chapter Five: Conclusions and Recommendations:
The final chapter will regard numerous recommendations from the author which may serve data
protection regulators in the Kenyan jurisdiction, as well as insight regarding the emerging issue




-') CHAPTER TWO: FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS AND THEORIES REGARDING
CLOUD COMPUTING AND THE HISTORY OF THE EMERGENCE OF DATA
PROTECTION POLICY IN THE GLOBAL DIGITAL MARKET:
A. Cloud Computing:
1. Introduction:
Cloud computing can technically be defined as an arrangement whereby computing resources are
provided on a flexible , location-independent basis that allows for rapid and seamless allocation
of resources on demand. 34 Typically, cloud resources are provided to specific users from a pool
shared with other customers with pricing, if any, often proportional to the resources used. The
delivery of cloud services often depends on complex, multi-layered arrangements between
various providers.
Many permutations are possible , but cloud computing activities are often described as falling
into one or more of the following three service categories:
1. Infrastructure as a Service ("IaaS"): raw computing resources, such as processing
power ("compute") and storage. "
2. Platform as a Service ("PaaS"): platforms for developing and deploying software
applications."
3. Software as a Service ("SaaS"): end-user applications.Y
Cloud users may run, typically via web browsers, application software installed on remote
servers which sends results to users over the Internet. This means that relativel y simple devices,
such as mobile phones or tablets , may be used to obtain access to vast computational resources.
The use of "as a Service" emphasizes a change in focus, from obtaining products or licenses to
renting the use of resources as services . These service models sit on a spectrum from laaS to
PaaS to SaaS, rather than being separate or discrete types of cloud computing.
34 Millard c., Cloud Computing Law, p.l
35Millard c., Cloud Computing Law p.2
36 Millard c., Cloud Computing Law p.2





~\ Generally , IaaS involves relatively low-level functionality for users, requmng greater user
sophistication and expertise, including more hands-on, and micromanagement of resources.
However, it affords the user more flexibility and fine control. SaaS provides high- level
functionality, and generally requires less user technical expertise, but offers less user control.
PaaS sits in the middle. Users are spared the need to manage raw processing/storage resources
actively , and may focus on programing applications to be hosted via the service. Boundaries
between them, particularly IaaS and PaaS, may blur; IaaS providers are increasingly offering
high level functionality. The latter is best illustrated by the provision of software development
kits for Java, mobile (Android, iOS) , PHP, Python, Ruby and ASP.NET programmers by the
Amazon Cloud Service Providers. PaaS, on the other hand offers lower-level detailed control. 38
SaaS is the most commonly used type of cloud service, particularly among consumers, which is
unsurprising as it generally requires the least technical know-how on the part of users , and
enables users to process use of application software quickly without installing any specific
software.
1) Types of cloud deployment models:
Cloud deployment models can be viewed in various ways but a widely used classification can be
shown as follows:
a) Private Cloud: This occurs where the relevant infrastructure is owned by, or operated
for, the benefit ofa single large customer or a group of related entities.39
b) Public Cloud: This occurs where infrastructure is shared among multiple users using the
same hardware and/or software. An apt example of this model can be seen through the
Facebook deployment model , as users utilize similar hardware and software resources in
order to access the service. It is vital to note that private and public should not be equated
with on and off premise. Infrastructure for cloud services may be located on users '
premises, or at one or more external locations. Private clouds are not necessarily on
38 ,Millard c., Cloud Computing Law p.3
39htt p://www.cisco.com!en! US!solut ions!coliateral!ns340! ns517! ns224!state of alaska cs.pdf (Accessed on






premise; the infrastructure/resources used could be managed, even owned, by a third
party, but dedicated to the user concerned. Public clouds, however, are generally off-
premise.
c) Community Cloud: This occurs where infrastructure is owned by, or operated for, and
shared among a specific group of users with common interests, such as US government
bodies and the financial services industry. An example of the former is the deployment of
the Microsoft Office 365 SaaS as a ' multi-tenant service that stores US government data
in a segregated community cloud.' A lucid illustration of the adoption of the community
cloud in the financial services industry can be shown by the NYSE Euronext's Capital
Markets Community Cloud for financial services (launched in 2011 in partnership with
storage provider EMC and virtualization firm VMWare), which offers applications and
services to customers via its ' own app store' , computing on-demand services, and
connections to NYSE Euronext's global trading network, including a market data feed.4o
d) Hybrid Cloud: This deployment model involves a mixture of the above, for example, an
organization which a private cloud may ' cloud burst' processing activities to a public
cloud for ' load balancing' purposes during times of high demand."!
2. The Cloud Supply Chain: Key Concepts:
In order to comprehend the various parties involved in any given cloud deployment model , as
well as the numerous legal risks present in the collection and analysis of data in any given cloud ,
it is key to unravel its cloud supply chain.
The cloud supply chain is intricate, and its complexity is differentiated by the type of cloud
service provided by the vendor. One cloud service may combine hardware and/or software
components from different suppliers or providers. Also cloud services may be combined or
layered.f
40Millard c., Cloud Computing Law p.3
41 Nati Shalom, 'What is Cloud Bursting?' .http://www.c1oudcow.com/what-c1oud-bursting (Accessed on
3/11/2015)






Cloud services ultimately employ physical infrastructure; equipment housed in physical
locations, typically data centres. The data centre ecosystem may involve different players
providing physical space, equipment (whether servers, storage or networking), software
infrastructure and services and ancillary services.Y Cloud platforms used as software
infrastructure for cloud services may be proprietary or open source, hosted-only or available as
installable software, and may not necessarily involve virtualization. Cloud service providers need
not use their own cloud platforms or application software. Therefore, the owner, operator,
manager, and user of a physical or software component may be different entities.
As a concrete illustration, a person X may buy or lease a dedicated data centre, or rent space in a
third party's data centre where others also rent space ('colocation'). X could buy or rent storage
servers or storage devices from third parties. Servers and other equipment could be dedicated to
X, or shared with others. X might manage 'its' servers itself, with only its own employees having
access to them, for example in a locked cage or room, perhaps with biometric entry for safety,
and so on. Or, X might use a third-party service provider to help run and maintain its servers. On
those servers, X could install a proprietary or open-source cloud platform.44 Some suppliers even
sell physical servers with open-source or proprietary cloud software infrastructure pre-installed.
X could offer the use of its cloud infrastructure to others as IaaS45. Or, X could build its own
PaaS platform on this infrastructure, to develop and host its own applications for private cloud,
or to offer PaaS services to others. PaaS platforms, whether stand-alone or built on existing IaaS
platforms, may also be installable on X's equipment, for X's own use or for offering to others as
hosted services.l" Physical and software infrastructure could be managed by X, or a third party
on its behalf, such as a systems integrator. X might have a separate consultancy, or other services
43 Millard C. Cloud Computing law, p. 14 .
44 According to C. Millard in Cloud Computing Law, p.14 r Canonical's Ubuntu Enterprise Cloud, which itself
leverages OpenStack. This illustrates that even cloud platform software is not a single concept; there may be
different kinds at different levels, for example, with more user functionality added, such as with Ubuntu Cloud.
45 For example, European telecommunications and managed service provider Colt uses VMWare's vCloud platform
to offer public and private cloud services as 'virtual data centres' in Colt's physical data centre, and Colt's physical
data centres, and Colt also provides connectivity for those services.




!\ contract, with an integrator to help it set up, manage or support its cloud.47 X could install, on its
own or third-party cloud infrastructure, application software it developed internally, or licensed
from third parties. It could use these applications internally, as private cloud, or offer them as a
service to others, as a SaaS provider." These illustrate that many combinations are possible , and
users may not necessarily know how a cloud service has been put together or who supplies
provides or operates different components.
Users may also combine different cloud providers' services. Ancillary support for primary cloud
services includes analytics, monitoring , and cloud-based billing systems. SaaS across different
providers is increasingly integrated. Providers may use third-party cloud security providers, and
integrate applications with, or support, 'non-cloud' components.i''
Cloud use is becoming increasingly sophisticated and continuously widespread. With traditional
IT, organizations may install and operate different applications, while .with cloud, customers
increasingly integrate different cloud applications and support services, with each other and with
legacy internal systems.
B) Layers or chains of cloud services:
Cloud computing often involves a combination of 'layers' of services and such layering may not
be transparent to users. The classification of a service depends on exactly which layers and actors
are under consideration. For example, a customers of Dropbox may consider that they obtain a
SaaS storage device from Dropbox. However, from the perspective of Dropbox , which built its
SaaS service on Amazon's IaaS infrastructure, Amazon provides an IaaS service, which Dropbox
uses to offer SaaS to its own consumers. Thus, Dropbox is both a cloud user (of Amazon IaaS)
and cloud provider (of SaaS storage, to its customers). 50
Furthermore, as already mentioned , PaaS may be layered on IaaS, SaaS on PaaS or IaaS; triple
layers are possible. Examples of these are as follows:
47Millard c., Cloud Computing Law, p.14
48Millard c., Cloud Computing Law, p.14
49Millard c., Cloud Computing Law, p.14





1) 'Unlayered' IaaS, such as Amazon Web Services, Rackspace, Go Grid, or Google
Compute Engine.
2) 'Unlayered' PaaS, such as Google App Engine, Microsoft Windows Azure or
Salesforce's Force.com
3) PaaS on IaaS, such as dotCloud, Engine Yard, or Heroku (all built on Amazon IaaS).
4) 'Unlayered' SaaS, for example social networking or sharing services such as Facebook
and Flickr, webmail services such as Gmail or Outlook. com, and Salesforce's customer
relationship management service.
S) SaaS on IaaS, such as Dropbox, or Mozy (both on Amazon IaaS); indeed, any SaaS
service built on Amazon, such as location-based consumer SaaS service Foursquare.
6) SaaS on PaaS, such as any SaaS service built on App Engine or Azure.
7) SaaS on PaaS on IaaS; any SaaS service built on IaaS-based PaaS services such as
dotCloud or Heroku.
This multiplicity of possible architectures for what appears, to the end user , to be a single cloud
service, means that users may be dependent on several different providers and sub-providers, this
results in an overall interdependency of cloud services in delivering certain cloud-based services
to end users.I' This was well illustrated in April 2011 when Amazon Web Services suffered an
outage in its US East Region and SaaS providers who relied on Engine Yard and Heroku were
adversely affected.52 Different contractual arrangements for supply or provision of different
components may also exist between different parties. Despite the potential importance for users
of multiple dependencies, it is often difficult for users to know who is involved in 'hidden'
service layers behind the direct provider, or to assess the risks of a hidden provider's service or
equipment failing.
It is possible that a particular cloud user might be the only entity involved in a private cloud
arrangement and might have direct control over every component of its cloud service ' stack' .53
In almost all cases, however, cloud computing arrangements are a new way of sourcing different
51Millard c., Cloud Computing Law, p.16 .
52 See http://gigaom.co m/clo ud/ m0 re-than-lOO-sites-went-down-with-ec2-incl uding-you r-paas-provid er>
(Accessed on 3/11/2015)




) IT resources from multiple providers and it is common for there to b~ complex relationships
between users and providers and between providers and sub-providers. 54
It is tempting to regard cloud computing as just a new form of outsourcing. Many commercial,
legal and regulatory issues relevant to outsourcing do indeed apply to cloud computing.
However, cloud computing has some fundamental characteristics that distinguish it from
traditional outsourcing and which may affect the provider's or user's position in relation to risk
management, contractual terms, and so on. In particular, there is considerable scope for
confusion in dealing with layered services, particularly as regards assurances relating to security
and sub-contractors.
C) Key differences from outsourcing:
Many current laws are difficult to apply to cloud arrangements because they do not cater
adequately for the distinctive characteristics of cloud computing, including those arising from
individual services' designs or from service type , particularly with public shared-infrastructure
IaaS and PaaS. Hence, analyzing legal issues present within the cloud is not always
straightforward.
The key differences between traditional outsourcing and cloud , which are important to bear in
mind when considering legal issues are:
1. Active agency versus passive resources for self-service usage: Unlike with traditional
outsourcing, public cloud providers do not act as agents that process data activel y for
users, but at most they passively store data which users choose 'to store and otherwise
process on the provider's infrastructure, Providers may be active in maintaining and
supporting the infrastructure and environment within which users process their data, but
data processing is generally performed, not by providers, but by users operating the
provider's resources on a self-service basis. 55
54 W. Kuan Hon and Christopher Millard, Cloud Computing vs. Traditional Outsourcing-Key Differences, Social
Sciences Research Network (12/9/2012) , p.l
55 Kuan Hon Wand Millard c., Cloud Computing vs. Traditional Outsourcing-Key Differences, Social Sciences




2. 'Direction of travel' and sequence of events: In classic outsourcing, successive
contacts 'down the chain' of processors may be easily tailored, from both timing and
control perspectives. However, cloud involves the opposite sequence of events and
'direction of travel '. Many cloud services are pre-packaged, standardized and
commoditized services, which may be built on existing sub-provider services on sub-
provider standard terms. The 'sub-service' in tum may be based on other services. A user
chooses the provider and pre-built package that it think best meets its specific processing
and other needs. It may, therefore, be difficult if not impossible to change particularly in
different ways for different customers, sub-contracts between the provider and its sub-
providers, because it has pre-built its service using standardized sub-service(s), rather
than being commissioned to provide a service to order. 56
3. Standardized share infrastructure and environments: Public cloud providers offer
standardized, shared infrastructure and environments, often using relatively cheap
commodity hardware, rather than tailoring them to each customer. Customization of
services is sometimes possible, but costs extra time and money. Although IaaS affords a
great degree of user control over individual resources, it is still provided in a standardized
environment using the provider's standardized system. Private cloud allows the most
customization and control, especially if on a user 's own infrastructure and managed by
the user, and if it is on third-party and/or managed by a third party, it is closest to
traditional outsourcing. Traditional outsourced processing may use standardized
infrastructure, sometimes at large scale, but it is unlikely to be shared to such an extent as
in cloud. With shared infrastructure where users ' data are segregated, not through their
being stored in separate physical equipment, but through their being separated ' logically'
using software, users are reliant on the software separation being implemented properl y
and securely. 57
4. Knowledge: In traditional outsourcing, processors are entrusted with the processing of
specific data or types of data. In cloud, depending on the service, some providers may not
56Kuan Hon Wand Millard c., Cloud Computing vs. Traditional Outsourcing-Key Differences, Social Sciences
Research Network (12/9/2012) p.3
57 Kuan Hon Wand Millard c., Cloud Computing vs. Traditional Outsourcing-Key Differences, Social Sci~nces




even know the nature of data (e.g. personal data) processed using their services, or how
users are processing data, unless and until the provider chooses actively to access such
data, assuming no encryption. In this sense, some providers are mere hosts renting out
resources, and ought not to be treated in the same way as providers who access and
utilize user data for their own purposes. Thus, 'the cloud of the unknowing' works both
ways, users may not have much knowledge regarding the supply chain, but providers
may not have much knowledge regarding data or processing either. 58
B. Foundational concepts of data protection:
Dictionaries and definitions seldom make compelling reading, but in the law an appreciation of
basic concepts is key to understanding of a topic. Prior to considering substantive aspects of data
protection, this section will consider in some detail the core concepts which define the scope of
data protection legislation. A number of definitional terms are closely linked to form a knot
almost Gordian in its complexity.59 Any attempt to describe and analyse them is hindered by the
fact that appreciation of the scope of one term presupposes to some extent understanding of
others. In the absence of a sufficiently sharp sword, the following precis may serve as an
introduction. The italicised terms will be subjected to more detailed analysis in the remainder of
this paper:
Data protection legislation applies where personal data (including sensitive personal data)
relating to an identifiable individual (data subject) is subjected to certain forms ofprocessing.
The nature and extent of the processing will be determined by a data controller, although the
actual processing may be carried out by a data processor operating under an outsourcing or
similar contract with the data controller.60
58Kuan Hon Wand Millard c., Cloud Computing vs. Traditional Outsourcing-Key Differences, Social Sciences
Research Network (12/9/2012) p.3
59Uoyd. J. Ian, Information Technology Law, Sixth Edition, p. 39




':', The Emergence of Data Protection in Contemporary History:
Initial legislative initiatives in the field occurred at the national level with the German state of
Hesse adopting the world's first data protection statute in 1970.61 The first national statute was
the Swedish Data Protection Act adopted in 1973.62 The fact that data protection laws were
pioneered in these two countries may not be entirely a matter of coincidence, and also illustrates
what might be classed as the positive and negative aspects of the system. In the case of Germany,
there had been experience of the misuse of data by totalitarian governments, both under the
Nazis and also looking eastward at the time to the Communist regime in the then East
Germany.r' In seeking to place limits on the ability of public and private sector bodies to process
personal data, the law can be seen as acting primarily in a defensive manner. The Swedish
situation was rather different. In this country there was no background of totalitarianism, but, a
more than two-century long tradition of freedom of information, under which almost any item of
information held by public bodies was considered to be in the public domain. 64 By conferring
rights on individuals to access information held on any computer, data protection could be seen
as extending some of the concepts of freedom of information into the private sector.65
Although the first data protection laws were enacted on a national basis , even prior to these
measures, pressure had been exerted for international action in the field. In many respects, a
comparison can be drawn with the first form of electronic data transfer made possible by the
electric telegraph around the middle of the nineteenth century" As national networks emerged,
governments initially resisted international connectivity largely because of fears that because of
the near instantaneous nature of telegraphic transmissions , messages against the national interest
might be transmitted without the possibility for interception in transit which featured strongly
with older postal systems of message delivery. Within a very few years, however , international
transfer agreements were adopted, firstly, on a unilateral basis, then between regional groupings,
61Uoyd. J. Ian, Information Technology Law, Sixth Edition, p. 21 .
62Simitis, 'Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society', University of Pennsylvania Law Rev, Vol. 135, No.3 (March,
1987), pp. 707-46.
63Simitis, 'Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society', University of Pennsylvania Law Rev, Vol. 135, No.3 (March,
1987), , pp. 707-45
64Uoyd. J. Ian, Information Technology Law, Sixth Edition, p. 21
65Uoyd. J. Ian, Information Technology Law, Sixth Edition, p. 21




;') and, finally, from 1865, under the auspices of the International Telegraph Convention and Union,
which formed the world 's first international organization and laid the basis for the free transfer
of data on a global basis.67 In the data protection context, two concerns prompted international
action. There were fears that national laws, which tended to have strong controls over the export
of data might have a protectionist effect. Conversely, there were fears by those states that had
adopted data protection legislation that national laws and policies could be circumvented by
organizations sending data abroad for processing in counties (often referred to as data havens)
which imposed few controls over processing activities." As a more technical level, the 1970s
also marked the period where developments in computers and communications teclmology
rendered feasible a massive expansion in multinational organisations. Although these had existed
for many years, activities tended to be restricted to activities such as car production, where
assembly plants in different companies operated largely as independent freedoms. The year 1971
marked the opening of the first McDonald 's restaurant in Europe.I" The essence of this and
similar businesses in the service sector is uniformity of product and identity across the globe.
Such activities required the application of computer systems able to communicate across national
boundaries. It was quickly recognised that international solutions were required in order to
reconcile the interests of individual privacy with commercial interests. It was accepted that
impossible burdens could be placed upon multinational enterprises should they be required to
comply with differing standards in every country in which they acquired , stored, processed, or
even transferred data. This indeed remains a problematic issue, with cOfl.1panies such as Google
advocating global data/privacy protection standards in order to simplify their task of complying
with laws on a global basis.7o From the late 1960s, a range of international agencies have been
active in the field of data and privacy protection. At the initial stages, the most prominent actors
were the Council of Europe and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD). The following sections will consider the major activities carried out under the auspices
of these organisations. Brief attention will also be paid to work co~ducted under the auspices of
the UN.
67Uoyd. J. Ian, Information Technology Law, Sixth Edition, p. 21
68Uoyd. J. Ian, Information Technology Law, Sixth Edition, p. 21
69, http://www.macdonald.com/history/the-first-European-outlet> {Accessed on 4/11/2015}




· '1 International Data Protection Regimes:
I. The Council of Europe
In 1968, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe addressed a request to the
Committee of Ministers that they consider the extent to which the provisions of the European
Convention on Human Rights safeguarded the individual against" the abuse of modern
technology." The Assembly noted particular concern at the fact that the European
Convention, together with its UN predecessor, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
had been devised before the development and widespread application of the computer.
Whilst identifying the dangers of computer abuse, the Assembly's report also drew attention
to a paradox which remains largely unresolved to this day72. Data protection seeks to give an
individual a greater measure of control over personal information and to place controls over
the dissemination of this information. This approach may conflict with another individual's
claim to be allowed access to information under the European Convention on Human Rights.
Here it is provided that: 'everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This shall include
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.' 73 The conflict is well illustrated
in cases such as Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers'" and Douglas v Hello!75 where
celebrities clashed with newspapers and magazines over the publication of photographs and
stories about them. In both cases, the disputes went to the House of Lords, which delivered
judgment for the complainants by slender 3:2 majorities.i" Acting upon the Assembly's
report, two separate resolutions were adopted by the Committee of Ministers, dealing with
the private and the public sectors. The differences between the two sets of recommendations
are comparatively minor, and for both sectors it was recommended that national laws should
71 In Lloyd J. Ian's Information Technology Law p. 24; he states :
'The linkage between data protection and notions offundamental human rights remains significant with the recent
European Charter of Fundamental Rights adopted in 2007 (but not applicable in the United Kingdom) providing in
Article 8 that 'Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her.'
72L1oyd J, Ian, Information Technology Law, Sixth Edition, p. 24
73 Article 10 of the European Court of Human Rights.
74Campbellv Mirror Group Newspapers[20041 UKHL 22 on appeal from [2002] EWCA Civ 1373 and [2002] EWHC
499 (QB).
7500uglas v Hello [2007] UKHL 21 on appeal from [2005] EWCACiv 106 and [2005] EWCA Civ 595, [2005] EWCACiv
861.





ensure that legislation should require that personal data be obtained fairly, that it should be
accurate and up to date, should be relevant and not excessive nor retained for longer than is
necessary. The recommendations also provided for controls over the range of disclosure of
data, the grant of subject access and the application of procedures to allow any errors in data
to be corrected.77
In an effort to minimise restrictions on the free flow of information, and in the hope of
preventing major discrepancies between the national data protection laws, the Council of
Europe moved beyond its earlier recommendations to sponsor the Convention for the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Automatic Processing of Personal Data
(hereafter, 'the Convention '). The Convention was opened for signature in January 1981 and
was to enter into force when it was ratified by five Member States of the Council of Europe.
This did not occur until October 1985. The Convention has been amended by an additional
protocol, 'regarding supervisory agencies and transborder data flows' , which was opened for
signature in October 2001 and entered into force in July 2004. At the time of writing, forty-
two countries have ratified the Convention and twenty-eight an additional protocol which
strengthens the original provisions in the areas of transborder data flow. Although the
Convention is open for signature by countries who are not members of the Council of
Europe, to date, no non-member State has done SO.7 8 The view has been expressed by several
United States commentators that the provisions of the Convention were motivated more by
considerations of commercial expediency and economic protectionism than by a genuine
concern for individual privacy. In the course of a meeting of the Committee of Experts, the
United States observer contrasted the sectoral approach adopted in that country with the
omnibus data protection legislation envisaged under the Convention, and concluded that:
. . . the draft convention appears to regulate a"junction, that is, ' it appears to regulate
automated or electronic data processing and what the automated data processing industry
may do with records about individuals. To our mind the draft convention is, in essence, a
\
.I
77Resolution (73) 22, The Council Of Europe.
78 This may be contrasted with the Council of Europe's Convention on Cybercrime , which has been signed by





scheme for the regulation of computer communications technology as it may be applied to
personal data record-keeping. The establishment cmd exercise of individual rights and the
privacy ofthe individual seem to be treated in a secondary fashion. I would note particularly
that the word privacy ' is rarely mentioned in the Convention and is not included in its title79.
According to Ian. J. Lloyd, such criticism is unfounded.8o In his opinion, the Convention, as
with much of the Council of Europe's work, is deeply rooted in the human rights context and
specifically in the European Convention of Human Rights and, indeed, as noted above,
Article 8 of the European Union's Charter of Fundamental Rights provides that 'Everyone
has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her.' There is thus a strong
linkage between notions of privacy and data protection. In its Preamble, the Convention
reaffirms the Council of Europe's commitment to freedom of information regardless of
frontiers, and proceeds to prohibit the erection of national barriers to information flow on the
pretext of protecting individual privacy." This prohibition extends, however, only where the
information is to be transferred to another signatory state. Impliedly, therefore , the
Convention permits the imposition of sanctions against any non-signatory state, especially
one whose domestic law contains inadequate provision regulating the computerised
processing of personal data.82 An intractable state could effectively be placed in data
quarantine. The standards required of domestic laws are laid down in Chapter 2 of the
Convention, and its requirements will be considered in detail, in the next chapter when
considering the substantive aspects of data protection. In addition to the Convention itself,
the Council of Europe has adopted a substantial number of recommendations concerning the
interpretation and application of the Convention principles in particular sectors, and in
processing for the purposes of particular forms of activity such as might be carried out by
79Text of United States Department of State telegram, quoted in Transnational Data Report, vol. 1/ no. 7 (1978), p.
22.
8oLl oyd J, lan, Information Technology Law, Sixth Edition, p. 26
81 Article 12(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
82 L1oyd, J. Ian, Information Technology Law, Sixth Edition, p. 26 ,The additional protocol referred to above was
drafted to bring the Convention into line with the EU/s Data Protection Directive. It provides that data may be




police authorities or insurance companies.t'Following an eight-year"period of inactivity, a
further recommendation on processing for the purposes of profiling was adopted in 2010.
II. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD):
At much the same time as the Council of Europe began its work in the field of data
protection, the topic also appeared on the agenda of the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (GECD). The GECD was established by international
convention in 1960 and, as its title suggests, is primarily concerned with facilitating
cooperation between member states in order to promote economic development. This might
be contrasted with the Council of Europe's emphasis on human rights. Unlike other
international organisations, the GECD functions as something of ~ Members Club, with
states wishing to join being required to satisfy the existing members as to their suitability.
The GECD currently has thirty members almost exclusively from the developed world.
Discussions regarding possible membership are ongoing with a number of countries,
including Russia and China, and cooperative agreements are in force with about seventy
countries.i" ensuring that the organisation's influence extends far beyond its formal
membership. A Council consisting of representatives of all the Member States is 'the body
from which all acts of the organization derive ,.85 The GECD's work in what it has tended to
refer to as the privacy protection field began in 1969 when a group of experts was appointed
to analyse 'different aspects of the privacy issue, e.g. in relation to digital information, public
administration, transborder data flows , and policy implications in general '. 86 A further group
was established in 1978 under Mr. Justice Kirby, then Chairman of the Australian Law
Commission. The United States representatives also played a prominent role in the group 's
activities and the resulting product in the form of a Recommendation to Member States
concerning Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Data Flows was
endorsed by the GECD Council in September 1980. It was part of the group's remit that its
83 The text of all these instruments can be obtained from http ://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/
dataprotection/Legal instruments en.asp (Accessed on 4/11/2015)
84htt p://www.oecd.org/ pages/ 0.3417.en 36734052 36761800 1 1 1 1 1.00.ht ml (Accessed on 4/11/2015}
85 Article 7 of the ECHR





'work was to be carried out in close cooperation with the Council of Europe and the
European Community'. 87 Although covering much the same ground as the Convention, the
Guidelines can perhaps be seen as a common law-based approach to the issues, as opposed to
the Convention which was drafted very much in line with the civil law tradition. It has been
suggested that:
In the final result, although substantially similar in core principles, the Convention and the
Guidelines could be analogised, albeit in a rough fashion, to the civil and common law
approaches, respectively. Common law systems proceed pragmatically, formulating the rules
oflegal behaviour as they acquire experience, while the civil law tradition tends to rely upon
codification ofrules in advance ofaction.88
Again, whilst the Convention is a legally binding instrument, the Guidelines, as the
terminology indicates, have no legal force. A further Declaration on Transborder Data Flows
was adopted by the OECD in April 1985. This made reference to the fact that: Flows of
computerised data and information are an important consequence of technological advances
and are playing an increasing role in national economies. With the growing economic
interdependence of Member countries, these flows acquire an international dimension.89 It
also indicated its signatories ' intention to promote access to data and information and related
services, and avoid the creation of unjustified barriers to the international exchange of data
and information, seek transparency in regulations and policies relating to information,
computer and communications services affecting transborder data flows, develop common
approaches for dealing with issues related to transborder data flows and, when appropriate,
develop harmonised solutions, consider possible implications for other countries when
dealing with issues related to transborder data flows.9o
It is clear from these objectives that commercial and trading interests provide at least as
significant a force for action as do concerns for individual rights. Although the Declaration
87htt p://www.oecd.org/document/ 18/ 0.3343.en 2649 34255 1815186 1 1 1 1.00.ht ml (Accessed on
4/11/2015)
88 Kirsch I., Lega/lssues of European Integration (1982), para 21 at p. 45
89 Lloyd J. Ian, Information Technoloqy Law, p. 28




commits its member countries to conduct further work relating to specific types of
transborder data flows, especially those accompanying international trade, marketed
computer services, and computerised information services and intra-corporate data flows, no
further measures have been adopted. In addition to its work in producing legal texts, the
OECD has also sponsored the development of what is referred to as a privacy generator.
9 1This online package is intended to be used by website developers and others to incorporate
procedures and safeguards to ensure that sites operate in conformity with the principles laid
down in the Guidelines .92
III. The Asia-Pacific Privacy Charter Initiative:
At a rather less formal level than has occurred within Europe, considerable work has been
carried out by a range of countries in the Asia-Pacific region (including the United States)
who have established the Asia-Pacific Privacy Charter Council. Hosted at the Cyberspace
Law and Policy Centre of the University of New South Wales, the Council is described as a
'regional expert group' which aims to: develop independent standards for privacy protection
in the region in order to influence the enactment of privacy laws in the region, and the
adoption of regional privacy agreements , in accordance with those standards.f The Council 's
work draws heavily on the APEC Privacy Framework drawn up by the Asia Pacific
Economic Cooperation Organisation, the Preamble to which recognises the need for APEC
economies to provide adequate protection for personal data in order to give individuals the
confidence necessary to participate in electronic commerce, behaviour which almost of
necessity requires the transfer of significant amounts of personal data.94 Although still at a
relatively early stage of development , the work provides further recognition of the global
nature of privacy issues and the relationship between the development of electronic
commerce and the effective protection of individuals ' data.
91 Lloyd J. Ian, Information Technology law, p.28
92htt p://www.oecd.org/document/39/0.2340.en264934255288632711111.00.html(Accessed on
4/11/2015





IV. The United Nations:
On 20 February 1990, the United Nations' Economic and Social Council agreed to the
Guidelines Concerning Computerised Personal Data Files. 95 These identify ten principles
which, it is stated , represent the 'minimum guarantees that should be provided in national
legislation'. The principles follow what might be regarded as the standard model , but there
are two features of these Guidelines which justify mention at this point. First , they make
provision for the application of the principles by international agencies." bodies which
might fall outside of national laws. Second , the UN Guidelines provide the option for the
extension of the principles, both to manual files and to files held concerning legal persona."
In line with the Convention's approach, the UN Guidelines envisage the establishment of a
supervisory agency providing that: the law of every country shall designate the authority
which, in accordance with its domestic legal system, is to be responsible for supervising
observance of the principles set forth above . This authority shall offer guarantees of
impartiality, independence vis-a-vis persons or agencies responsible for processing and
establishing data, and technical competence. In the event of violation of the provisions of
the national law implementing the aforementioned principles, criminal or other penalties
should be envisaged together with the appropriate individual remedies.f" Recent years have
seen attempts made to involve the UN more deeply in the data protection field . At the 2009
meeting of data and privacy protection commissioners, a P~'oposal was endorsed
encouraging the adoption of ' International Standards for the Protection of Privacy and
Personal Data ' , allowing the development of a universal, binding legal document, which
must be backed by the most extensive institutional and social consensus via the participation
of the authorities and institutions guaranteeing data protection and privacy and
representatives of both public and private entities and organisations." In February 2010 the
95Available from http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher.UNGA.THEMGUIDE..3ddcafaac.O.html(Accessed on
4/11/2015}
96Available from http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher.UNGA.THEMGUIDE..3ddcafaac.0.html(Accessed on
4/11/2015}, Part B.
97, Available from http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher.UNGA.THEMGUIDE..3ddcafaac.O.html(Accessed on
4/11/2015} para. 10
98Available from http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher.UNGA.THEMGUIDE..3ddcafaac.0.html(Accessed on
4/11/2015}, para. 8




UN rapporteur on human rights made a call for the establishment of global privacy
standards.Y" It is unclear when, or if, such an activity might be undertaken. The meeting of
data and privacy protection commissioners, as the name implies, is dominated by
representatives from countries which endorse the European model of protection with the
establishment of dedicated supervisory authorities. As has been discussed, belief in the
efficacy of this approach is not shared in other jurisdictions. There is also a gulf between
countries which view data protection as essentially rooted in notions of human rights and
those which see data protection as having an economic basis. In part this is based on notions
of international data flows but at an internal level there is also often the belief that e-
commerce and other online activities will flourish only if individuals have confidence that
their data will not be misused.
V. The European Data Directive & The Data Protection Act 1998:
Until the early 1990s, the EU had played a peripheral role in the data protection arena. This
could be ascribed to two main causes . First, the limited nature of the legislative
competencies conferred by the establishing treaties gave rise to doubts as to whether, and to
what extent, the ED was empowered to act in this field . Although the increasing importance
of information as a commodity within the Single Market has provided a basis for European
action, the exclusion of matters coming within the ambit of national security and, to a partial
extent criminal and taxation policy, has served to limit the scope of the EU's intervention. A
second factor influencing work in this field had been a reluctance on the part of the
Commission to duplicate work being conducted under the auspices of the Council of Europe
and in 1981, the Commission addressed a Recommendation to Member States that they sign
and ratify the Convention.Y'By 1990, the Convention had been signed by all the Member
I
States, but ratified only by six. 102 As will be described, the Convention establishes minimal
standards but affords considerable discretion to signatories. A number of Member States ,
such as Germany and Sweden, had enacted laws which were considerably in advance of the
Convention's minimum standards, whilst others, such as the United Kingdom, had openly
100http://www.theregister.co.uk!2010!01!20!un terror! (Accessed on 4/11/2015)
1010J 1981 L 246/31.





indicated an intention to do the bare minimum necessary to satisfy obligations under that
instrument. By 1990, Commission concern at the effect that discrepancies in the Member
States' laws and regulations might have on inter-community trade resulted in proposals
being brought forward for a Directive 'On the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free · Movement of Such Data' .103 The EU
legislation, it was stated, would ' give substance to and amplify'I'" the provisions of the
Convention. The objective of the proposal was stated to be to harmonise the data protection
laws of the Member States at a 'high level' .105 This approach was necessary because the
Directive was adopted under the authority of Article 100a of the Treaty of Rome. This
provides that the Community's law-making bodies may: adopt the measures for the
approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in
Member States which have as their object the establishing and functioning of the internal
market. Reliance upon Article 100a has the further significant consequence in that any
harmonising measures introduced under its authority have to secure 'a high level of
protection'. Effectively, therefore, the Directive has to secure ·a level of protection
equivalent to the highest currently available in the Member States. It is unclear how
effective the Directive has been in this regard , with complaints being aired from countries
such as Germany that implementation might dilute their existing regimes, especially in
respect of transborder data flows. For the United Kingdom, implementation of the Directive
required significant change to the Data Protection Act 1984, as well as its expansion. A
Consultation Paper was published by the Home Office in March 1996, seeking views on the
implementation of the Directive .and indicating a preference for a minimalist approach to
law reform: Over-elaborate data protection threatens competitiveness, and does not
necessarily bring additional benefits for individuals. It follows that the Government intends
to go no further in implementing the Directive than is absolutely necessary to satisfy the
United Kingdom's obligations in European law. It will consider whether any additional
changes to the current data protection regime are needed so as to ensure that it does not go
1030 J 1990 C 277/03.
104 OJ 1990 C 277/03, para. 22





beyond what is required by the Directive and the Council of Europe Convention. The
Commission's proposal for a general Directive in the area of data protection was
accompanied by a further proposal for a Directive ' Concerning the Protection of Personal
Data and Privacy in the Context of Public Digital Telecommunications Networks' .106
Following a five-year journey through the EU 's legislative processes, the Data Protection
Directive was adopted on 24 October 1995, with a requirement that it be implemented
within the Member States by 24 October 1998. The Telecoms Directive-which for a while
appeared to have been dropped from the legislative agenda-resurfaced, to be adopted in
December 1997. It also required to be implemented by October 1998. The Telecoms Data
Protection Directive proved to be a somewhat short-lived measure: In conjunction with a
much broader reform of the European telecommunications regulatory regime, the Directive
was replaced in 2002 by the Directive ' Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the
Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector'. This was required to be
implemented in the Member States by 31 October 2003. Once again, aspects of the
Directive proved short-lived with the adoption of Directive 2009/136/E, generally referred
to as the 'Citizens' Rights Directive' in November 2009. This Directive requires to be
implemented in the Member States by May 2011. 107 In January 1998 a Data Protection Bill
was introduced in the House of Lords. Its progress through Parliament was relatively
uncontroversial, with only one division being required throughout its parliamentary
passage. lOS The major feature of the Bill's progress was the very large number of
amendments tabled by the government -more than 200 in total. The Act received the Royal
Assent on 16 July, although its entry into force was delayed pending the drafting of what
proved to be seventeen items of secondary legislation and it was not until I March 2000 that
the new legislation entered into force. In its failure timeously to implement the Data
Protection Directive, the United Kingdom was joined by a majority of the Member States.
Legal action was raised by the Commission against Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland,
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, alleging a continuing failure to implement the Directive,
.J
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although in the case of every state except Luxembourg, the belated implementation of the
Directive resulted in the legal proceedings being abandoned. 109
VI. The Data Protection Act 1998:
As an initial comment, it may be noted that the Data Protection Act 1998 is considerably
larger than the 1984 legislation. The Data Protection Act 1984 has forty three sections and
six Schedules; the 1998 statute has seventy-five sections and sixteen Schedules. To an
extent greater than its 1984 precursor, the Act provides only a framework, with significant
matters remaining to be determined by statutory instruments. Although this approach will
allow easier modification and updating of the legislation than was possible with the 1984
Act, significant issues relating to the identification of those data controllers who may be
exempted from the notification requirement are not covered in the Act. Given that the Data
Protection Act 1998 is intended to implement a European Directive account has to be taken
of the provisions of the latter. In Campbell v MGN LtdllOLord Phillips of Worth Matravers
MR stated that:
In interpreting the Act it is appropriate to look' to the Directive for assistance. The Act
should, if possible, be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with the Directive.
Furthermore, because the Act has, in large measure, adopted the wording of the Directive,
it is not appropriate to look for the precision in the use of language that is usually to be
expected from the parliamentary draftsman. A purposive approach to making sense of the
provisions is calledfor.
The European Court of Justice has also held in Osterreichischer Rundfunk'" that at least
some of the provisions of the Directive are sufficiently precise to be relied upon directly by
individuals within the Member States. The Data Protection Act 1998 extends significantly
the area of the application of the legislation, including regulating some systems of manual
records. In the accompanying Explanatory and Financial Memorandum, it was estimated
109 For current information on the status of implementation, see http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/
privacy/lawreport/index en.htm#fi rstreport (Accessed on 5/11/2015)
110[2002] EWCACiv 1373, [2003] QB 633 at [96].




that compliance with the then transitional regime would result in start-up costs to private
sector data-users of some £836 million, with recurring costs of £630 million. The start-up
costs for the public and voluntary sectors were estimated at £194 million and £120 million
respectively, with recurring costs of £75 million and £37 million. These figures are in
addition to the costs incurred in complying with the 1984 data protection regime, although
no evidence has been published as to the scale of the present costs. The Home Office
Regulatory Appraisal and Compliance Cost Assessment makes it clear that estimates are
based upon a very small sample of users. Only four large and three small manufacturers
were surveyed, for example, and although much publicity has been given to headline figures
of £1 billion cost arising from implementation, the assessment document itself highlights the
need to approach these estimates with caution. The Commissioner has also questioned the
accuracy of the financial calculations.l'f suggesting that this may have resulted from
misunderstandings as to the nature of the Data Protection Directive's requirements. To
justify costs of some £20 for every inhabitant of the United Kingdom, it is to be hoped that
the new legislation-perhaps coupled with other legislative initiatives in the field of human
rights and freedom of information-will provide the basis for enhanced public awareness of
the crucial importance of information in modem society, and the need to secure an
appropriate balance between those who hold and use data and those who may be affected by
such activities.
VII. The African Union Data Protection Convention 2014:
The potentially most important development in data protection regulation and policy in
Africa is the adoption on 27 June 2014 of the African Union Convention on Cyber-security
and Personal Data Protection.l " at the African Union's Summit in Malabo , Equatorial
Guinea. The African Union (AU), which has as its members all 54 African states except
Morocco , was developing since 2011, a draft Cyber-security Convention (now renamed to
include data protection). Inclusion of Chapter II of the Convention, 'Personal Data
Protection' , means that State parties who accede to and ratify the Convention are committed
112Press Release, 28 January 1998
113 See https:/Iwww.sbs.ox.ac.uk/cybersecurity-capacity/content/african-union-convention-cyber-security-and -




to 'establishing a legal framework ' based on its provisions, although this is stated to be
'without prejudice to the free flow of personal data' .114 Africa is now the first Continent
outside Europe to adopt a data protection Convention.
The starting points are conventional El.I-influence definitions of 'personal data ' in terms of
direct or indirect identifiability of a person, of ' processing' in broad terms, and of a'data
controller' lIS. Its scope extends to the public and private sectors generally, and to automated
and non-automated processing. 116 Processing relating to 'public security, defense, research,
criminal prosecution or State security' is covered but allowed to be subject to some
exceptions defined by specific provisions in existing laws. Processing exclusively for an
individual's ' personal or household activities' is exempt, but not where ' for systematic
communication to third parties or for dissemination'. Any processing for journalistic or
research purposes is exempt, if conducted within professional codes of conduct, as well as
any processing for artistic or literary expression 117.
114 Article 8 on the African Union Convention on Cyber-security and Personal Data Protection,
115Article 1 on the African Union Convention on Cyber-security and Personal Data Protection.
116 Article 9 of the African Union Convention on Cyber-security and Personal Data Protection.




CHAPTER THREE: DATA PROTECTION PRINCIPLES




1. Identifying personal data in the European Data Protection Regime;
1. Personal data
The Data Protection Directive defines personal data in relatively simple terms as 'any
information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (data subject)' .118 The United
Kingdom's 1998 Data Protection Act's approach is rather more complicated and analysis needs
to proceed through a number of steps. The legislation initially states that it applies to 'data
which, relate to a living individual'. 11 9 The Act contains a further addition, providing that the
term extends 'to any expression of opinion about the individual and any indication of the
intentions of the data controller or any other person in respect of the individual ,.120 This
repr~sents in large part an unfortunate legacy from the original Act of 1984 which included a
widely criticized distinction between statements of opinion( which were classed as personal
data)and statements of the data controller's intentions towards the data subject(which were not).
The argument put forward by the government of the day was that statements of intention were
personal to the data controller rather than to the subject. This is certainly arguable , but the point
applies with equal if not greater validity with regard to statements of opinion. Even the then Data
Protection Registrar was moved to comment to the effect that he found the distinction unclear
and the provision in the Data Protection Act 1998 should perhaps be seen as a measure to
remove what had generally been considered an unsatisfactory distinction , rather than a deliberate
effort to depart from the requirements of the Directive. 121 There are, however, significant
questions whether the Act's provisions fully meet the requirements of the Directive. The threat
of legal action by the European Commission alleging a failure properly to implement the
Directive has been looming for a number of years. One perhaps peripheral issue is whether the
legislation should apply to data relating to deceased individuals. The Directive, it will be
118 Article 2{a) of the European Union's Data Protection Directive.
119 Section 1(1) of the United Kingdom's Data Protection Act 1998
120 Lloyd J. Ian, Information Technology Law, Sixth Edition pAD




recalled, applies in respect of data relating to a 'natural person'. It is arguable that this state
continues after the individual 's death. A minority of Member States have, indeed, chosen to
extend their national laws to this category of data. Even accepting the validity of the United
Kingdom's interpretation of the concept ofa 'natural person' as a living individual, there may be
circumstances in which data concerning a deceased person may also have implications for living
individuals and therefore come within the scope of the legislation. Certain diseases such as
haemophilia are hereditary in nature. The son of a woman suffering from the disease in its active
form will always inherit the condition. Data indicating the mother's condition will therefore
convey information about the medical condition of any male children. Again, some EU Member
States apply at least elements of the legislation to data relating to legal persons. The United
Kingdom does not, although it should be noted that legal persons do acquire some protection
under the provisions of the communications-specific Directive on universal service and users'
rights relating to electronic communications networks and services .l22 Although in its early
stages data protection law tended to apply almost exclusively to textual information ,
developments in technology mean that almost any form of recorded information is likely to come
within the ambit of the legislation. In the event that an individual interacts with an automated
}
telephone service by speaking a series of numbers or words to allow a call to be directed to the
appropriate department, those recorded words will class as personal data. Again , CCTV or
similar camera systems generally fall within the scope of the legislation in respect of the video
images recorded. 123
Much attention is paid today to the collection and use of biometric data in situations such as the
issuance of passports and visas. Although the term does not have a precise definition, it is
generally regarded as encompassing two categories of data. The first relates to the physiological
characteristic relating to aspects of physical identity. This category would include items such as
fingerprints and, perhaps relating to more advanced forms of technology, face and iris
recognition. A second category of biometric data relates to what are referred to as behavioural
characteristics. As the name suggests , this concerns the manner in which a person acts. A simple
and long-established example would relate to the manner in which a person signs his or her
122 Directive 2009/136/Ee, OJ 2009 I, 337/1l.




--'" name. More technologically advanced versions relate to the use of software to monitor the
manner in which a particular individual uses a computer keyboard in terms of the speed,
accuracy, and force with which keys are depressed. Biometric data, which forms a cornerstone of
modem passports, is clearly an aspect of personal data. Data may be objective or subjective and,
indeed, true or false. In an Opinion on the concept of personal data,124 the Article 29 Working
Party suggested that:
As a result of a neuropsychiatric test conducted on a girl in the context of a court proceeding
about her custody, a drawing made by her representing her family is submitted. The drawing
provides information about the girl 's mood and what she feels about different members of her
family. As such, it could be considered as being 'personal data '. The drawing will indeed reveal
information relating to the child (her state ofhealth from a psychiatric point of view) and also
about e.g. her father's or mother's behaviour. As a result, the parents in that case may be able to
exert their right ofaccess on this specific piece ofinformation.
As indicated in the above example, personal data may relate to more than one person, a topic
which will be exploited in this chapter.
2. Sensitive data
Any piece of information, however insignificant, might be classed as personal data. The extent
to which certain forms of data can be classed as especially sensitive and deserving of special
protection has long been a contentious issue. During the passage of the United Kingdom's Data
Protection Act 1984, the attempt to identify sensitive data was considered a fool's errand by the
English Parliament. In the case of personal data, the context in which data was held or used was
considered far more important than the data itself. A list of names and addresses, for example ,
would not normally be considered sensitive, but this view might change if it referred to the
movements of prominent persons and was in the hands of a terrorist o~·ganisation. Whilst this
view is not without merit, it does seek to transform the exceptional into the norm. Almost
invariably, however, data protection statutes have recognised that there are certain categories of
information which would generally be regarded as possessing a degree of sensitivity and the





.", processing of which should be subjected to more stringent controls than would generally be
applicable. The Data Protection Act provides for special treatment for data relating to: the racial
or ethnic origin of the data subject; his political opinions; his religious beliefs or other beliefs of
a similar nature; whether he is a member of a trade union; his physical or mental health or
condition; his sexual life; the commission or alleged commission by him of any offence; or any
proceedings for any offence committed or alleged to have been committed by him, the disposal
of such proceedings, or the sentence of the court in such proceedings.Y' With the exception of
substituting the term ' other beliefs of a similar nature' for the Directive's" philosophical beliefs' ,
the Act's terminolog y mirrors that of the Directive.
In addition to covering a wide range of categories of information , the scope of particular
categories has been broadly interpreted by the courts. In Bodil Lindqvist' i" the European Court of
Justice was asked to give a preliminary ruling in response to a number of questions posed by the
Swedish courts. Mrs. Lindqvist had been convicted of breaches of the Swedish data protection
law in respect of her work as a catechist in the Swedish Lutheran Church and preparation of a
number of WWW pages which contained information about Mrs. Lindqvist and eighteen of her
parish colleagues, including brief details of the nature of their work and hobbies. It appears that
much of the information was presented in what was intended to be a light-hearted manner. One
particular item of information which was the cause of specific investigation was the indication
that a named person had injured her foot and as a consequence was able to work only on a part-
time basis. The essential question posed to the Court was whether such data constituted sensitive
information regarding that person 's medical health, as such Mrs. Lindqvist was prosecuted by
the Swedish authorities on a number of charges, including one of processing sensitive personal
data without having secured authorization from the data protection authorities. The court's reply
was succinct and emphatic:
125 Section 2 of the United Kingdom's Data Protection Act.




In the light ofthe purpose ofthe Directive, the expression data concerning health used in Article
8(1) thereof must be given a wide interpretation so as to include information concerning all
aspects, both physical and mental, ofthe health ofan individual. /27
In some respects, the decision in Bodil Lindqvist illustrates the difficulties surrounding the
concept of sensitive data. Once included in a list of sensitive data, it is almost impossible to say
that a reference to illness or injury is not included, but as indicated above context is perhaps
more important than content. A reference to the fact that an athlete was unable to compete in a
race because of a broken leg, for example, does not seem to be possessed of a sufficient degree
of sensitivity to justify the imposition of additional controls. 128
1. Relating to the data subject
In Bodil Lindqvist, there was no doubt that the information about the foot injury related to the
individual concerned. In other cases the situation may be more complex. In the example of the
child's drawing cited above, the data contained might relate in varying degrees to the child and
. 1 to other family members. Neither the Directive nor the Act provides any definition when data
relates to an individual and this has been a rather contentious issue. The point was discussed
extensively in the case of Durant v Financial Services Authority'29 and more recently has been
considered in an Opinion of the Article 29 Working Party and in Guidance produced by the
United Kingdom's Information Commissioner together with the decision of the House of Lords
in the case of Scottish Information Commissioner v Common Services Agency.130 In Durant , the
appellant had been involved in a protracted dispute with Barclays Bank. This had resulted in
unsuccessful litigation in 1993 and a continuing course of complaints to the industry regulatory
body, the Financial Services Authority (FSA). The present case arose from a request from the
appellant for access to a range of records under the ambit of the subject access provisions of the
Data Protection Act 1998. Although some information was supplied, access to other records was
127Case 101/01, (2004) QB 1014
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-"I provided only in partial form through the concealment or redaction of information which it was
considered related to third parties.':" Other records were withheld on the grounds either that the
information contained therein did not constitute personal data relating to -the appellant, or in the
case of a number of records which were maintained in manual filing systems, that the system
was not covered by the Data Protection Act. Although there was no doubt that much, if not all, of
the data in question had been generated following complaints from the appellant, the critical
issue was whether it related to him. Counsel for Durant argued that the term 'relate to ' should be
interpreted broadly to encompass any data which might be generated following a search of a
database made by reference to an individual's name. Thus, for example, a document describing
the action which had been taken in response to a complaint from the appellant would be classed
as personal data by virtue merely of the fact that his name would appear within the text. Counsel
for the respondent advocated a more restrictive approach, making reference to the Shorter
Oxford English Dictionary, which contained two definitions of the term, a broad reference to
having 'some connection with, be connected to ' and a more restrictive notion that there should be
reference to or concern with a subject, ' implying, in this context, a more or less direct connection
with an individual '. This more restrictive interpretation was adopted by the Court of Appeal. The
purpose of the subject access provisions in the legislation was , it was stated, to enable the data
subject to verify that processing did not infringe his or her rights of privacy and to exercise any
available remedies in the event this was considered not to be the case. The purpose of the
legislation was not, it was held , to give an automatic right of access to information purely by
virtue of the fact that he might be named in a record or have some interest in the matters covered.
In particular, it was stated, subject access was not intended to assist him , for example, to obtain
discovery of documents that may assist him in litigation or complaints against third parties,
Giving effect to this principle was that the mere fact that a search of a computer's contents by
reference to a data subject's name revealed a number of documents did not mean that these
documents necessarily constituted personal data relating to the subject. A more sophisticated
analysis was required, The Court thus opined that:




:'1 ... there are two notions that may be of assistance. The first is whether the information is
biographical in a significant sense, that is, going beyond the recording of the putative data
subject's involvement in a matter or an event that has no personal connotations, a life event in
respect ofwhich his privacy could not be said to be compromised. The second is one offocus.
The information should have the putative data subject as its focus rather than some other person
with whom he may have been involved or some transaction or event in which he may have
figured or have had an interest, for example, as in this case, an investigation into some other
person's or body's conduct that he may have instigated. In short, it is information that affects his
privacy, whether in his personal orfamily life, business or professional capacity. 132
This approach adopts, it is suggested, an overly restrictive view of the rationale of data
protection laws. Whilst determining the legality of data processing and correcting errors certainly
constitute important elements, equally important is the ability to become aware of what data is
held. Much of the Data Protection Directive l33 and the Data Protection Act 1998's requirements
relating to the factors legitimising data processing stress the importance of the data subject being
aware of what is happening with regard to personal data. As was stated by the German
Constitutional Court in the 1980s:
The possibilities of inspection and of gaining influence have increased to a degree hitherto
unknown and may influence the individual's behaviour by the psychological pressure exerted by
public interest . . . if someone cannot predict with sufficient certainty which information about
himself in certain areas is known to his social milieu, and cannot estimate sufficiently the
knowledge ofparties to whom communication may possibly be made, he is crucially inhibited in
his freedom to plan or to decide freely and without being subject to any pressure/influence. 13-1
These factors support the adoption of an expansive definition of the scope of personal data. In a
case such as Durant, it may well be that personal data in the form of an individual's name or
other identifying data makes a peripheral appearance in a record. Rather than arguing that the
appearance of the data does not come within the scope of the Act, it might be preferable to focus
132Durant v Financial Services Authority [2003] EWCACiv 1746 at paras 27-28.
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'\ upon the extent of the information which might be supplied. 135 Whilst the court was clearly
concerned that the data protection legislation was being invoked in the present case in the
attempt to obtain discovery of documents and data that could not be obtained through other legal
channels, it might have been preferable to have laid greater stress on the limited nature of the
information which would be classed as personal data. The Information Commissioner has
subsequently noted that ' the Court of Appeal was widely understood to have adopted a rather
narrower interpretation of personal data ... than most practitioners and experts had followed
previously' .136 The Article 29 Working Party's Opinion provides extensive guidance when data
relates to an individual. Referring to its previous work in relation to RFID chip technology, it
affirms that 'data relates to an individual if it refers to the identity, characteristics or behaviour
of an individual or if such information is used to determine or influence the way in which that
person is treated or evaluated ,.I37The Opinion identifies three elements which may indicate that
data relates to a particular individual. These are referred to as content, purpose, and result
elements. The distinction between the elements may be complex on occasion but the Working
Party stress that only one element needs to be present in order to justify a finding that data relates
to a particular individual. The content element will be satisfied when information is about an
individual. A medical or personnel record, for example, will fall within this category. The
purpose element applies when the data is intended to be used to determine the maimer in which
an individual is treated. Data may, for example, be recorded by an employer of the websites
accessed from workplace computers. The purpose may be to take disciplinary action against
employees who violate Internet usage policies. Finally, a result element applies when the use of
data, even though not collected originally for that purpose, is likely to have even a minor impact
upon an individual's rights and interests. Guidance produced by the United Kingdom's
Information Commissioner emphasizes similar criteria, suggesting that:
135Uoyd, Information Technology Law, Sixth Edition pAO
136Data Protection Technical Guidance, 'Determining what is personal data', p.6
137Working Party Document No. WP 105: 'Working document on data protection issues related to RFID technology',




Data which identifies an individual, even without a name associated with it, may be personal
data where it is processed to learn or record something about that individual, or where the
processing ofthat information has an impact upon that individual. 138
The most recent development in the field has come with the decision of the House of Lords in
the case of Common Services Agency v Scottish Information Commissioner. 139 The case revolved
around what is a complex and sometime difficult relationship between two statutes that are
concerned with rather different aspects of information policy. This case was concerned with a
request submitted to the appellant agency, a Health Board, under the terms of the Freedom of
Information (Scotland) Act 2002 140 for the provision of information relating to instances of
childhood cancer within the locality of a nuclear power station. Under the terms of the 2002 Act
a range of exceptions apply regarding the types of information which may be supplied and, in
particular, it is stated that personal data is not to be disclosed where this would be in
contravention of any of the data protection principles.i'" Relying on this provision the appellant
refused to disclose information. The Scottish Information Commissioner ruled that such a
blanket refusal was unlawful. Although the raw data identifying individual patients was
) undoubtedly personal data disclosure would not be in breach of the data protection principles
were to it be processed using a procedure known as 'barnardisation' which would modify
statistical elements so that no individual could be identified. The appellant was ordered to
conduct such a process. The Commissioner's ruling was upheld by the highest Scottish court, the
Court of Session. 142 Applying the approach of the Court of Appeal in Durant v Financial
Services Authority143 that 'mere mention of the data subject in a document held by a data
controller does not necessarily amount to personal data ,144 the Lord President ruled that:
138 Working Party Document No. WP 105: 'Working document on data protection issues related to RFID
technology', adopted on 19 January 2005, p. 8.
139Common ServicesAgency v Scottish Information Commissioner(2008) UKHL 47.
140 According to Ian J Lloyd, The Scottish legislation is equivalent in all relevant respects to the Freedom of
Information Act 2000 applying in England and Wales
141 Section 38
142 (2006) CSIH 58
143(2003) EWCA Civ 1746




r) Although the underlying information concerns important biographical events of the children
involved, by the stage of the compilation of the barnardised table that information has become
not only statistical but perturbed to minimise the risk of identification ofany individual child. It
is no longer, in respect ofany child, 'biographical in a significant sense '. The focus has, in my
view, also moved away from the individual children to the incidence of disease in particular
wards in particular years. The rights to privacy of the individual children are not infringed by
the disclosure ofthe barnardised data. 145
'-.
" ,
A further appeal was made to the House of Lords where, delivering the leading judgment, Lord
Hope gave detailed consideration to the scope of the definition of personal data and also of
sensitive personal data. In respect of the former he indicated that the Court of Appeal decision in
Durant should be distinguished as it related to the operation of the subject information provisions
rather than the definition of personal data per se. The answer to that issue, he held, 'must be
found in the wording of action 1(1) (of the Data Protection Act 1998) read in the light of Council
Directive 95/46/ EC.' 146 The Act refers to the possibility that an individual might be identified
from data 'and other information which is in the possession of the data controller'. As the
appellant had the means to recreate data identifying individuals , the barnardised data remained
personal data. Turning to the question whether the data could be disclosed in conformity with the
provisions of the Act, Lord Hope cited the provisions of Recital 26 of the Directive to the effect
that when data was truly anonymous 'the principles of protection shall not apply to data'. Section
1(1) it was held, gave effect to this provision. As noted previously, Recital 26 of the Directive
states that in making decisions as to whether an individual can be identified 'account should be
taken of all the means likely reasonably to be used either by the controller or by any other person
to identify the said person ' .147 The appellant clearly had the means to match data to named
individuals but the issue in this respect was whether a third party receiving the barnardised data
would be able to re-engineer it. The Scottish Information Commissioner, it was held, should
have considered more fully this issue and, accordingly, the case was remitted for him to make
145[2003] EWCA Civ 1746, At para.23
146[2003] EWCA Civ 1746, At para 20.




findings of fact in this respect. Ultimately, the Commissioner issued a further ruling 148 holding
that he was not satisfied that anonymity could be guaranteed and on this basis the freedom of
access request was denied. In some respects the decision in Common Services Agency might be
seen to have limited the application of the Court of Appeal case in Durant although the rather
opaque way in which it has been done cannot eliminate all scope for confusion. What appears to
be the effect of Lord Hope's dicta is that any element of data relating to an individual will be
classed as personal data.
II. Issues of identification.
The premise underlying data protection legislation is that the processing of data relating to
individuals constitutes a threat to the subject's rights and freedoms. If an individual cannot be
identified from the manner in which data is collected, processed , or .used, there can be no
significant threat to privacy and no justification for the application of legislative controls. The
Data Protection Directive provides that: an identifiable person is one who can be identified
directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more
factors specific to his physical, psychological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity. 149
Also relevant are the provisions of Recital 26 to the Directive. This states that:
Whereas the principles ofprotection must apply to any information concerning an identified or
identifiable person; whereas, to determine whether a person is identifiable, account should be
taken of all the means likely reasonably to be used either by the controller or by any other
person to identify the said person.
The United Kingdom's Data Protection Act 1998 provides that personal data: . . . means data
which relates to a living individual who can be identified- (a) from those data; or (b) from
those data and other information which is in the possession of or is likely to come into the
possession of the data controller.
148Available from http://www.itspublicknowledge.info/applicationsanddecisions/Decisions/2005/200500298.asp
(Accessed on 11/6/2015)




",\ It will be recognised that the Directive and the Act differ in that the Act restricts its application to
information which is or is likely to come into the possession of the data controller. The
Directive's application is open-ended, applying whenever anyone might be able to identify an
individual. A recent example might illustrate a difference between the two approaches. In 2006,
AOL placed 011 the Internet data relating to search requests made by millions of its subscribers.
Although no names were published, in at least some cases it proved possible to identify
individuals following analysis of their search history. One case concerned a user allocated the
identifying number 4417749. This user had conducted searches on a range of topics, including
medical conditions relating to humans and animals, landscape gardening, persons with a
particular surname (Arnold), and house sales in a particular area of the United States. Taking this
data, researchers focused on a particular individual, Thelma Arnold, who, when read in a list of
the searches, confirmed that they had been made by her. 150
Under the United Kingdom approach, it is likely that the data would not have been considered
personal data at the point it was compiled by AOL because that organisation would not have
possessed the necessary additional information to identify users. 151 Under the Directive's criteria,
) the material would probably have been classed as personal data, as AOL would have been
required to consider the possibility that third parties could perform the task of identification. It is
likely that if its disclosure and decoding were to be carried out in the United Kingdom (or any
other state of the European Economic Area (EEA)) the person identifying individuals would be
classed as a data controller in his or her own right and subject to the same obligations to comply
with data protection law. Matters would be much less satisfactory were the decoder to be located
outside of the EEA and, of course, dissemination of information via the Internet is global in its
nature. The AOL example undoubtedly represents an extreme case but the issue of identifiability
may frequently be an issue. Once again, the Article 29 Opinion on the concept of personal data
identifies a wide range of potential situations and provides extensive guidance. Linking data to a
150http:/ / www.iht .com/ art icles/ 2006/ 08/ 09/ business/ aol.php (Accessed on 11/06/2015)
151 Given that AOL operates on a subscription service it may be that the company would have possessed the
necessarydata. The example might be more accurate in the event that it applied to an organisation such as
Google, which does not require users to give their names. Indeed, one of the reasons why Google refused to
comply with a United States government request for access to search data was because of concerns that





upon request. Prior to the introduction of these regulations, the officers were required to
supply copies of the Register only where these were readily available. The consequence was
a massive increase in the usage of data from the Electoral Rolls for direct marketing and
similar purposes. Following the report of a working group, the Home Secretary reported to
Parliament concerns that:
As the law stands, anyone may buy a copy of the electoral register for any purpose. The
Home Office and electoral administrators receive more complaints about that than any other
subject. People are unhappy about the large amount of unsolicited mail (junk mail) from
companies that have obtained their details from the electoral register. Perhaps more
worryingly, the advent ofpowerful CD-ROMs compiled from the electoral register, which
allow for searching by name, means for example that abusive spouses can trace their former
partners with considerable ease using a single CD-ROM People who feel threatened in that
way may simply not dare to register. All of that, together with the requirements of the
European Union data protection directive, 184 which yvas signed and agreed by the previous
Administration and, generally, ofthe right to privacy, led the working party to conclude that
it was wrong that people should be under a statutory obligation to provide their details for
electoral registration purposes and then have no say about whether- that information could
be usedfor other unrelatedpurposes. 185
.,)
Section 9 of the Representation of the People Act 2000 made provision for regulations to be
made to establish two versions of the Electoral Register. As implemented in the Representation
of the People (England and Wales) (Amendment) Regulations 2002,20 voters will be given
information regarding the purposes for which data contained in e register might be used and
given the opportunity to opt out of having their data disclosed. Registration officers will then be
charged with producing two registers. The full register will contain details of all persons eligible
to vote, which will be restricted to electoral purposes and a number of closely defined
applications. Although this is available for public consultation it is provided in Regulation 6 that:
184Directive 95/46/EC.




A person who inspects the full register and makes a copy of it or records any particulars
included in it otherwise than by means ofhand-written notes shall be guilty ofan offence.
An edited copy excluding the details of those who have opted out will also be produced, which
may be supplied and used for commercial purposes. 186 By 2005, around 30 per cent of voters had
exercised their right to opt out of the commercially available Electoral Register. Such a level
would diminish the value of the resource. The data held on the B4U.com website was taken from
the 2001 Electoral Roll, the last created before the 2002 Regulations. The use to which the data
was put was lawful under the law as it stood at the time that the Electoral Roll was drawn up.
However, the Information Commissioner determined that the use of the data in 2006 constituted
unfair processing. The Commissioner through the enforcement notice asserted that he considered
that it is inherently unfair for individuals to be compelled to provide personal information on
penalty of a criminal conviction only for that information to be subsequently disclosed to
commercial organisations without any express restrictions on its use. The Commissioner went on
to state that, given that individuals had been given a right to request that ,they are excluded from
the edited register, it was rather unfair to undermine the express wishes of those who have
exercised that right and the 2002 Regulations by continuing to make the relevant data available
on the data controller's website. Moreover, the Commissioner considered that the processing of
the relevant data by the data controller is unfair given that a significant proportion of the
individuals whose details are contained in the relevant data will have subsequently exercised
their right not to have those details included in the edited electoral register. Accordingly, the
website owner was ordered to cease making the data available on its website.l'"
The case can perhaps be seen as a borderline one and it is perhaps unfortunate that the
Information Tribunal was not called upon to deliver a determination. If data was 10-years old,
could processing still be classed as unfair? Or 20-years old? Data controllers should be able to
assess whether their processing will comply with the requirements of the legislation and at least
in this area, it is submitted, the state of the law is insufficiently precise. Although Electoral
186 Section 9 of the Representation of People's Act (2000)
187 Currently, the B4U.com site holds no evidence of having such data, however a sister site does exist that sells




- 1 Registers may represent the most extensive record of their kind, similar issues have arisen with
other forms of records which are required to be made available to the public. Concern has been
expressed on a number of occasions at the use made of lists of company shareholders,
particularly in the case of privatised undertakings which might have several hundred-thousand
shareholders. It may be argued that the purpose of making details of shareholders publicly
available is to allow identification of the owners of a limited liability company. Use of this
information for the purposes of compiling mailing lists for direct marketing purposes raises
different issues, although it is difficult to see how prohibitions might be enforced against the use
of publicly available information for such purposes. 188
One of the most recent cases concerned with the issue of fair processing is Johnson v Medical
Defence Union.189 The case centred upon whether the use of a risk assessment policy by the
Medical Defence Union could be considered unfair. The scheme took account of the volume of
incidents reported involving a particular member and it was an integral element that limited
regard was taken of the outcome of such cases. The view was taken that if a doctor had a
significant history of complaints brought against him in the past, this would be a reliable
" indicator that the trend would continue, and regardless of whether the previous complaints had
proved to be unfounded. The prediction would be that the Medical Defence Union would be
required to incur continuing expenditure in representing the doctor in the future. Although there
was disagreement between the judges on whether processing had taken place, there was
unanimity on the issue of fairness. At trial, having taken account of t~e decision of the Data
Protection Tribunal in the case of CCN Systems v Data Protection Registrar,190 , Mr. Justice
Rimer concluded that:
.. "There is in principle nothing relevantly unfair about the MDU's risk assessment policy or
about the way in which it processed information in applying that policy. . . . The policy is
directed at risk management (preserving the ' MDU funds against a risk of claims, and the
188 In the recent conversion process of the Halifax Building Society, members were encouraged to place their new
shareholding in a nominee account administered by the Society. One advantage claimed for this was that the
shareholder's name and address would not appear on publicly available registers.
189Johnson v Medical Defence Union. [2007] EWCA Civ 262.
190CCN Systems v Data Protection Registrar, Available from




:") incurring of costs, in the future. The MDU experience is that a risk of that nature cannot be
measured simply by awaiting the happening ofa statistically significant number ofoccurrences
that do infact cause a drain on its fundsr"
The Court of Appeal upheld this position and pointed out that the MDU's risk assessment policy
was fair in accordance with the first data protection principle and no actions undertaken by the
Union had proved to the contrary.
II. Lawful Processing:
As with the requirement of fairness , neither the Act nor the Directive provides any definition
when conduct will be lawful. In the decision of the House of Lords in R v R, a case concerned
with marital rape, the concept of unlawful conduct was defined by Lord Keith as relating to
'something which is contrary to some law or enactment or is done without lawful justification or
excuse' .192 In Legal Guidance on the Act,193 the Information Commissioner indicated that it was
necessary for a data controller to comply with all relevant rules of law whether derived from




A number of particular areas were identified as being of particular relevance , these included
confidentiality arising from the relationship of the data controller with the data subject; the ultra
vires rule and the rule relating to the excess of delegated powers, under which the data controller
may only act within the limits of its legal powers; legitimate expectation, that is, the expectation
of the individual as to how the data controller will use the information relating to him; and
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which demands the right to respect for
private and family life, home, and correspondence.
It is essential to note that the concepts of lawfulness and fairness are largely intertwined and
thusly, in the course of their application, do collide in numerous occasions.
191CCN Systems v Data Protection Registrar, [2006] EWHC 321 (Ch) at para . 122.
192CCN Systems v Data Protection Registrar, at para. 124
193 Available from http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/data protection/detailed




...... A. Consent and data:
Over the years, there has been extensive debate on how a data subject may validly give consent
to the processing of personal data. Anyone who has entered into almost any form of mail order or
online transaction will be familiar with the basic techniques which are used. Typically, as was
described in the context of the Innovations and Linguaphone Tribunal cases discussed below, a
note of the data controller's processing intentions will be given on an order form or similar
document.
Under what is referred to as an 'opt-out' procedure, the data subject will be told that the specified
forms of processing will take place unless notice of objection is received. This would normally
require that the subject places a mark in an 'opt-out' box. The alternative approach , referred to as
'opting in' , is again to give notice of the desired forms of processing but also to ask the data
subject to indicate that they are content for this to take place. Typically, data controllers have
sought to maximize the use of the former technique, as it is well accepted that this will maximise
the number of persons whose data may be processed. In many cases, data subjects may not read
the notice or may be unaware of the full implications of what is being proposed. A typical
.: formulation might be along the lines, 'We would like to share your data with other carefully
selected companies whose goods or services we consider may be of interest to you.' Of course,
the real implications of such consent would be the sale of the data to the highest bidder. Whilst
data subject apathy may help controllers on an opt-out basis, the reverse will be the case where
subjects are asked to opt in.
Schedule 2 to the United Kingdom's Data Protection Act 1998 provides that processing will be
lawful when 'the data subject has given his consent to the processing'. Schedule 3 requires that
the subject gives 'explicit consent'. Neither phrase is defined in the Act. The Data Protection
Directive is a little more helpful, providing that the data subject's consent can be defined as any
freely given specific and informed indication of his wishes by which the data subject signifies his
agreement to personal data relating to him being processed. 194




., '(' In the context of consent to the processing of data, the Directive requires that consent be given
unambiguously. This term is not defined. As interpreted in the United Kingdom , it is generally
seen as being compatible with either an opt-out or opt-in approach , with the basic requirement
being that the data subject is able readily to give an indication of his wishes. Albeit in a different
context, the Article 29 Working Party appears to suggest that an opt-in approach may be needed.
In an ' Opinion on unsolicited communications for marketing purposes ' {" it considered the
requirement in the Privacy and Electronic Communications Directive that prior consent be
obtained before commercial emails are sent to data subjects. It asserted that implied consent to
receive such mails is not compatible with the definition of consent of Directive 95/46/EC and in
particular with the requirement of consent being the indication of someone's wishes, including
where this would be done 'unless opposition is made' (opt-out). Similarly, pre-ticked boxes, e.g.,
on websites are not compatible with the definition of the Directive either. At least pending any
court decision either in the United Kingdom or before the European Court of Justice, it appears
that an 'opt-out' approach will be accepted in the United Kingdom. A key criteria in determining
the acceptability of the technique concerns the clarity of the notification. In Linguaphone
Institute v Data Protection Registrar,1 96 a case brought before the Tribunal under the 1984 Act,
the appellant included in its advertisements a notice to the effect that:
(Please) tick here if you do not wish Linguaphone to make your details available to other
companies who may wish to mail you offers ofgoods or services.
In holding that there was a breach of the data protection principles , the Tribunal expressed
concern that the opt-out box appeared in minute print at the bottom of the order form. In the
Tribunal's view the position , size of print and wording of the opt-out box did not amount to a
sufficient indication that the company intended or wished to hold, use or disclose that personal
data provided at the time of enquiry for the purpose of trading in personal data. Beyond giving
1950pinion 5/2004, available from http://ec.europa.eu/justice home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2004/ wp90 en .pdf
(Accessed on 7/11/2015)





information to the data subject, the controller must afford a reasonable opportunity for the
subject to express consent (or the lack of it).197
This was at issue in another case brought before the Data Protection Tribunal under the 1984
Act, Innovations v Data Protection Registrar. 198 In this case, the appellant was in the business of
mail order sales. Custom was solicited in a variety of ways, including the distribution of
catalogues and the placing of advertisements in various media, including newspapers, radio, and
television. The appellant's catalogues gave customers notice of this possibility and its order
forms offered customers the opportunity to exclude use of their data for broking purposes. Some
adverts, especially those appearing on radio or television, did not make mention of the
possibility, and in the event that catalogue orders were placed by telephone, no mention would
be made of this secondary purpose. An acknowledgement of an order would , however, be sent
and this would convey the message:
For your information. As a service to our customers we occasionally make our customer lists
available to carefully screened companies whose products or services we feel may interest you.
Ifyou do not wish to receive such mailings please send an exact copy ofyour address label to . ..
The Registrar took the view that notification of the intended use came too late in the contractual
process and served an enforcement notice alleging a breach of the first data protection principle,
which, as formulated under the 1984 Act, required that data be obtained fairly and lawfully. A
number of arguments were put forward by the applicant as justifying their practices. It was
suggested that, at the time of placing an order, customers would be concerned primarily with
obtaining the goods and that a notice along the lines referred to above would have limited
impact. Where orders were made by telephone, giving specific notice would increase the length
of the call, thereby increasing costs for both the supplier and the customer. It was also pointed
out that the details would not be used for list-broking purposes until thirty days from the date the
acknowledgement order was sent. This, it was suggested, allowed ample time for the customer to
opt out. It was also pointed out that the appellant's practices were in conformity with an industry
code of practice and the Council of Europe 's Recommendation on the protection of personal data
197 Lloyd J. lan, Information Technology Law, p. 93




.', used for the purposes of direct marketing. 199 Notwithstanding these factors , the Tribunal upheld
the Registrar's ruling. Although codes of practice and recommendations might constitute useful
guidance, the task for the Tribunal was to interpret the law. Use of the data for list-broking
purposes, it was held, was not a purpose which would be obvious to the data subjects involved.
Fair obtaining required that the subject be told of the non-obvious purpose before the data was
obtained. Whilst a later notification might 'be a commendable way of providing a further
warning', it could not stand by itself. Where prior notification might not be practicable, the
Tribunal ruled that ' the obligation to obtain the data subject's positive consent for the non-
obvious use of their data falls upon the data user' .2°°
An important aspect of the concept of consent in data protection regulation is its duration.
Consent is not a permanent condition. It is open to a data subject to withdraw consent at any
time. This point is not specified directly in either the Data Protection Act or the Directive. Article
9 of the Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications,201 which refers specifically to the
processing of personal data in the electronic communications sector,202 provides that users or
subscribers shall be given the possibility to withdraw their consent for the processing of location
data other than traffic data at any time. There is no doubt that whilst the withdrawal of consent
cannot have retrospective effect, it would serve to render unlawful any future processing which
is dependent upon this head of authority. i '"
3. Unlawful acquisition of personal data:
The second data protection principle requires that personal data shall be obtained only for one or
more specified and lawful purposes and shall not be processed further in any manner
incompatible with that purpose or those purposes. Given the breadth of the definition of
processing (which refers specifically to the obtaining of data) it is difficult to identify a real need
for the second data protection principle. Indeed, much the same comment could be made
regarding most of the remaining principles which refer to specific aspects of processing. In
199Recommendation 85/20
200 Innovations (Mail Order) Ltd v Data Protection Registrar Case DA/92 31/49/1 atPara. 31.
201 Directive 2002/58/EC, OJ 2002 L 201/37
202Directive 2002/58/EC, OJ 2002 L 201/37




interpreting the second principle , the Act provides that the purposes for which data are to be
processed may be specified either by the giving of notice to the data subject or in a notification
given to the Commissioner. It is to be noted, however, that notification by itself will not satisfy
the requirements of the first data protection principle . The more significant element of the second
principle concerns what might be regarded as ongoing processing activities. Data may be
obtained for one purpose with due notification given to the data subject but changes in
circumstance or technical developments may make other forms of activity attractive to the
controller.204 The UK's Information Commissioner has indicated that a strict view will be taken
in determining whether any future forms of processing whether carried out by the controller or
by a third party to whom the data are disclosed are compatible with those originally notified to
the Commissioner or to the data subject.2os During recent years, considerable publicity has been
attached to the activities of private investigators and investigative journalists, who, through
various forms of subterfuge or bribery, were able to secure access to personal information held
by a data user. Stella Rimington, the former head of MIS, for example , has been quoted as
claiming that upon her appointment to MIS, The Sunday Times had employed a private
investigator who had been able to discover where she lived, how much money she had in her
bank account, the shops she regularly patronised, her (ex-directory) phone number, and the
telephone numbers that she most frequently called206.In the situation 'where the investigator
obtained direct access to data held on a computer, it would be likely that an offence would be
committed under the United Kingdom's Computer Misuse Act 1990. In many instances,
however, the information would be obtained, either through bribing an employee of the data user
or by misleading the user as to identity and entitlement to access the data. In these situations, the
investigator would not normally be guilty of any offence. To remedy this' situation , section 55 of
the Data Protection Act 1998 provides that an offence will be committed by a person who
'knowingly or recklessly , without the consent of the data controller ' seeks to obtain or disclose
personal data or procure its disclosure to a third party. An exception is provided where the data is
obtained in connection with the prevention or detection of crime or in pursuance of a court order.
204 Lloyd J. Ian, Information Technology Law, p. 95
2°\egal Guidance, para . 3.2 .




A further offence is committed by a person who sells or offers to sell data obtained in
contravention of this provision. Both convictions are punishable by a fine of up to £5,000 in the
Magistrates' Court and to a potentially unlimited amount in the Crown Court. In spite of the
prohibition, there is extensive evidence that the trade in unlawfully acquired personal
information is continuing at a rapid and unprecedented pace.207
4. The principles of adequacy and relevance:
The third data protection principle of the Data Protection Act 1998 asserts that data shall be
adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purpose or purposes for which they are
processed. The Data Protection Directive208 uses the same term. No further guidance is available
in either instrument concerning the application of these requirements.
The application of this data protection principles was at issue before the Information Tribunal in
the case of The ChiefConstables ofWest Yorkshire, South Yorkshire and North Wales Police and
the Information Commissionerit" At issue in this case were the data retention practices of a
number of police forces in respect of three individuals. In each case, the individual had been
convicted of criminal offences: in one case, a single offence in 1979; in the second, five offences
\
relating to the taking of motor vehicles, the last conviction also being in 1979; and in the case of
the third data subject, five offences ending with a conviction for theft in 1969. In each case, the
primary cause for complaint was that the information had been disclosed for purposes
unconnected with the operation of the criminal record system: in one case, in connection with a
complaint made by the data subject in respect of the conduct of a police officer; in another, to the
United States immigration authorities in respect of a visa application; and in the third, in
connection with an application for employment. Following the receipt of complaints from the
data subjects, the Information Commissioner exercised his powers under section 42 of the Act to
conduct an assessment of the legitimacy of the processing of the personal data. After extensive
correspondence with the police authorities in question, the Commissioner served each with an
207 Lloyd J. lan., Information and Technology Law, p. 107
208Directive 95/46/EC.
209The Chief Constables of West Yorkshire, South Yorkshire and North Wales Police and the Information
CommissionerAvailable from http://www.informationtribunal.gov.uk/DBFiles/Decision/i204/north wales




~l enforcement notice alleging breaches of the third and fifth data protection principles. The
authorities appealed to the Information Tribunal. In all the cases, data had been retained on the
police national computers and it was accepted that it was held in accordance with the latest
version of'Weeding Rules', which had been the subject of discussion, if not agreement, between
the Information Commissioner (and his predecessors) and the Association of Chief Police
Officers. In essence, these provide for details of relatively minor offences to be retained for 30
years and more serious offences for a period of 100 years, a period designed to ensure that the
data is retained for the lifetime of the offender. It was accepted by the Tribunal that the Weeding
Rules in their present form and edition demonstrated that there was some value in retaining
conviction data dependent largely upon the nature of the offence. The Weeding Rules represent a
considered exchange between the parties, i.e. the Commissioner on the one hand and ACPO on
the other which has in the result forged some form of generalised understanding that after a given
data, certain offences should be removed from the PNC(Police Nationai Computer). However,
the Tribunal found that the Weeding Rules do not and could not conceivably represent an
unqualified and rigid code.210 The Tribunal drew a distinction between retention and disclosure
of the data. Accepting the benefit for policing purposes of retention of data, even at the level of
maintaining links to fingerprint and DNA samples, it amended the Commissioner's ruling to
require that within six months the appellants: . . . procure that the Conviction Data relating to
(the complainant data subjects) currently held on the PNC database be retained on the PNC
subject to the retention rules of any current ACPO Code ofPractice or any equivalent thereof
and not be open to inspection other than by the data controller or by any other data controller
who is or represents a chief officer ofpolice. 211
The Commissioner returned to the question of the conformity of police data retention in the later
case of Chief Constable ofHumberside Police and others v Information Commissioneri' i This
marked the first occasion in which a decision of the Information Tribunal was the subject of an
appeal to the Court of Appeal. The South Yorkshire case had focused in large part on issues
210The Chief Constables of West Yorkshire, South Yorkshire and North Wales Police and the Information
Commissioner at Para. 206
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: i\ concerned with the disclosure of data for purposes other than those concerned with core policing
activities. These were again at issue in the Humberside litigation but attention was also given to
the retention of data on the Police National Computer. Police Guidelines in England and Wales
(a significant factor in the decision of the Tribunal was that Scotland operated a more subject-
friendly policy) provided for the retention of almost all data relating to criminal convictions for a
period of 100 years. 213
Following a series of complaints from data subjects, the Commissioner served enforcement
notices on five police forces, each relating to records relating to one individual and requiring
removal of the data from the Police National Computer. As discussed in relation to the South
Yorkshire case, access to data might be restricted although at issue in most of the present cases
was an act of disclosure to other statutory agencies, generally in connection with the system of
extended disclosure certificates introduced under the Police Act 1997.2 14 Any person seeking to
work with vulnerable individuals such as children is required to obtain such a certificate which
will detail any criminal convictions or formal reprimands received by the individual. In four of
the cases forming the basis of the enforcement notices the individuals concerned had been
-l convicted of relatively minor criminal offences some time in the past. One subject, referred to as
HP, had been convicted on two counts of shoplifting in 1984 when aged sixteen. No further
convictions were recorded against him. The conviction details were listed on an enhanced
disclosure certificate which he was required to obtain twenty-two years later when seeking a
position with a local authority as a care officer. Three of the other cases were broadly similar but
in the final case a 13-year old girl (referred to as SP) had been accused of assault. She had
accepted a formal reprimand but was assured that details would be deleted from the Police
National Computer when she reached the age of eighteen if she had not committed any further
criminal offences. By the time of her eighteenth birthday, police policy had changed and the
details were retained, again to appear on an enhanced disclosure certificate obtained in
connection with an application for employment as a care worker. In this case the enforcement
notice alleged also a breach of the first data protection principle that the retention of the data in
breach of undertakings given constituted unfair processing. The Tribunal received statistical
213 Lloyd J. Ian, Information Technology Law, p. 9S




.) evidence indicating that where individuals had such long periods without being convicted of any
offences, the likelihood of them being convicted in the future was effectively the same as that of
a person with no previous criminal conviction . The Tribunal agreed with the Commissioner that
the continued presence of the data on the Police National Computer offered no significant
operational benefits to the police and upheld 'the enforcement notice. It agreed also that the
retention of data in the case of SP breached the first data protection principle. The police forces
concerned appealed against the Tribunal decision and were successful before the Court of
Appeal which was highly critical both of the Commissioner's original decision to serve the
enforcement notices and of the Tribunal 's decision to uphold them.
Delivering the leading judgment, Lord Justice Waller quoted the evidence given to the Bichard
Enquiry. This was set up in the wake of a case in which a school caretaker had murdered two
young girls. Subsequently evidence came to light that the caretaker was known to other police
forces in connection with inappropriate conduct towards girls but that this information had not
been passed on to the force in whose area the murders took place. Responding to suggestions by
some police authorities that the requirements of data protection legislation had prevented the
} sharing of information, the then Information Commissioner gave evidence to the Inquiry which
was summarised to the effect that, Police judgements about operational needs should not be
lightly interfered with by the Information Commissioner. His office ' cannot and should not
substitute their judgement for that of experienced practitioners'. His office should give
considerable latitude to the police in their decision making. If a reasonable and rational basis
exists for a decision, 'that should be the end of the story' .215 The same principle, Lord Justice
Waller held, should apply in the present case, ' If the police say rationally and reasonably that
convictions, however old or minor, have a value in the work they do that should, in effect, be the
end of the matter' It should be noted that the case of SP did cast a rift of opinion between
numerous Honorable Judges of the Court, however the majority agreed that the processing had
not been particularly unfair, as it was due to a change in policing policy and was not specifically
directed at the plaintiff.




5. Accuracy and Timeousness:
The fourth data protection principle requires that: 'personal data shall be accurate and, where
necessary, kept up to date'. Data is regarded as being inaccurate when it is 'incorrect or
misleading as to any matter of fact' .216 In the event that personal data is inaccurate, a data subject
may be entitled to seek its rectification and, in certain cases, compensation for any resultant
damage or distress.i'" The Data Protection Directive explains it as follows:
The fourth principle is not to be regarded as being contravened by reason ofany inaccuracy in
personal data which accurately record information obtained by the data controller from the data
subject or a third party in a case where- (a) having regard to the purpose or purposes for
which the data were obtained and further processed, the data controller has taken reasonable
steps to ensure the accuracy of the data; and (b) if the data subject has notified the data
controller ofthe data subject's view that the data are inaccurate, the data indicate thatfact?18
These requirements are cumulative.
The second element of this principle requires that necessary updating of information shall be
-, carried out. The question of whether updating is required will be dependent upon the nature of
the data and the purpose to which it will be put. If the data is merely a record of a transaction
between the data user and the data subject, no updating would be either necessary or justified.
Where the information is being used as the basis for continuing decisions and actions, regular
updating may be essential. Thus, where information is to be used for assessing an employee's
suitability for promotion, an indication of periods of absence would require to be supplemented
by any explanations which might subsequently have been provided.
6. Data Security:
Under the terms of the United Kingdom's Data Protection Act 1998; data controllers and the
operators of computer bureaux are obliged to ensure that appropriate technical and organisational
216 Section 70(2}, Data Protection Act 1998.
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'I measures shall be taken against unauthorised or unlawful processing of personal data and against
accidental loss or destruction of, or damage to, personal data. Additionally, controllers will be
responsible for ensuring that any data processors contracted by them comply with the
requirements of the principle. The comparable requirement in the Data Protection Directive is
that, taking account ofthe state ofthe art and making an assessment ofcosts and risks involved: .
. . the controller must implement appropriate technical and organizational measures to protect
personal data against accidental or unlawful destruction or accidental loss, alteration,
unauthorized disclosure or access, in particular where the processing involves the transmission
ofdata over a network. 219




", CHAPTER FOUR: ANALYSING THE PRESENT DATA PROTECTION
FRAMEWORK WITHIN THE KENYAN JURISDICTION THROUGH THE
CONSTITUTION, KENYAN JURISPRUDENCE AND THE AFRICAN UNION'S
CONVENTION ON PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION AND CYBERSECURITY:
Introduction:
Having peered into the various principles outlined by British and European data protection law,
this paper can thus proceed to critically examine the current state of data protection within the
Kenyan jurisdiction vis-a-vis the data protection regime present in Europe. This chapter will
achieve the latter in three ways; through an incisive look into the Constitution and the Articles
therein that may enable data protection legislation, through analyzing the Court 's rationale in the
decision of Benard Murage v. Fineserve Africa Limited and Four Others (Petition No. 503 of
2014) one of the Kenyan judiciary's encounters with a data-centric technology, and through
analyzing the various data protection principles present within the African Union 's Convention
on Personal Data Protection and Cybersecurity.
1. Constitutional Provisions and the Data Protection Agenda:
The protection of the fundamental rights of her citizens is one of the essential functions of the
State, and this mandate is certainly implemented by the Constitution of Kenya. Insofar as data
protection is concerned, the Constitution outlines the following Articles in order to protect its
citizens:
1. The protection of fundamental rights:
ill Article 46: Consumer rights: The Constitution under Article 46 seeks to protect her
citizens as consumers of various products and services in the Kenyan market. The latter
has an immense effect in the provision of software goods and the participation of
companies in the Kenyan Digital Market. According to the tenets of Article 46, Kenyans
have the right to; goods and services of reasonable quality; the information necessary for
them to gain full benefit from goods and services; the protection of their health, safety,




goods or services.22o To these ends, Parliament is expected to enact legislation to provide
for consumer protection and for fair, honest and decent advertising. Moreover, Article 46
applies to goods and services offered by public entities or private persons.
The fact that the Constitution points out that there every citizen is entitled to the
protection of their health, safety and economic interests as consumers, lucidly justifies the
need for data protection regulation within the State. As cybercriminals ravage technology
businesses and extract valuable data regarding various enterprises, the economic interests
ofthese corporations and their clientele are singularly and jointly affected. Moreover, the
guarantee accorded to consumers for compensation in the event, of loss or injury from
defective goods and services may ultimately justify consumer claims for losses sourcing
from the effects of unprotected databases by vendors. An example would be the
extraction of contact details from the numerous money transfer services offered in Kenya
by service providers , leading to the eventual siphoning of monies from affected accounts.
The account holders in the set up outlined are provided with a sovereign basis to claim
for such costs. Similarly, the Constitution also broadly allows any injury caused by the
consumption of goods and services to be worth compensation.r" This also poses a
problem for software enterprises, as claims regarding libel and injury of reputation due to
the breach of their security databases and/or use of their software products could be
substantiated by this provision. Further, the implementation of these consumer rights are
not limited to private enterprises and rightly so. Public entities are also expected to
safeguard consumers from loss or injury from use of their products, digital or
otherwise222•
Parliament, according to Article 46, has also been placed with the significant
responsibility of developing the appropriate consumer protection framework for the
benefit of her citizens. It is disappointing to note that the protection of the data integrity
of consumers within the Republic of Kenya has not been in any way legislated against in
the Consumer Protection Act. It is vital that the data derived from consumers be
220 Article 46, Constitution of Kenya (2010)
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protected, as it may be just as valuable to market producers (if not more) and its
protection could go a long way in fulfilling the government's dual mandate of protecting
citizens' fundamental rights while facilitating economic growth.
Q} Article 31: Privacy: Under Article 31, every person has the right to privacy, which
includes the right not to have information relating to their family or private affairs
unnecessarily required or revealed; or the privacy of their communications
infringed.223The latter has been established as a universal and fundamental right, and can
thus be seen in Article 8 of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European
Union. This has impacted data protection regulation as individual rights are heavily
considered in European legislation. Similarly, the right to privacy within the Kenyan
jurisdiction necessitates the implementation of sound data protection policies to protect
the family life and correspondence of each individual within the State.
2. Jurisdiction:
a) Article 22: Under Article 22(1), every person has a right to institute court proceedings
claiming that a right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights has been denied,
violated or infringed, or is threatened.r'" This enables users of digital products and
services to seek legal redress for any violation of their fundamental rights through the
Kenyan justice system. Further, under Article 22(4), the absence of rules establishing a
fair, neutral and knowledgeable adjudication process does not hinder the administration
of justice through the judicial process. In essence, the lack of the appropriate data
protection regulatory framework in no way hinders the assertion and protection of one's
fundamental rights in a Kenyan Court of Law.
It is interesting to note that in the case of Coalition for Reforms and Democracy v
Attorney General'i" , the Court interpreted the use of the term, ' threatened' in Article 22
to expressly state that for relief to be granted by the Court, it is not necessary for the
223 Article 31, Constitution of Kenya (2010)
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actual breach of the Constitution or violation of fundamental freedoms to be evidenced,
but rather that such violation or breach could be imminent.
b) Article 165: Article 165(3) establishes the High Court's jurisdiction to determine matters
where a right or a fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights has been denied, violated or
infringed. With this Statute, it can be evidenced that in the absence of a determined data
protection tribunal, the Kenyan Constitution has enabled the High Court to adjudicate
over such violations. This determination will be made clear by the analysis of Benard
Murage v. Fineserve Africa Limited and Four Others further in this chapter.
c) Article 258: Under Article 258(1), The Constitution states that every person has the right
to institute court proceedings, claiming that it has been contravened, or is threatened with
contravention. Moreover, under (2), In addition to a person acting in their own interest ,
court proceedings under clause (1) may be instituted by a person acting on behalf of
another person who cannot act in their own name; a person acting as a member of, or in
the interest of, a group or class of persons; a person acting in the public interest; or an
association acting in the interest of one or more of its members.
2. Petition No. 503 of 2014: An analysis of the interaction of the Kenyan legal regime
and emergent, data-centric technologies:
A. Introduction:
The iconic case of Benard Murage versus Fineserve Kenya Limited, Equity Bank Limited,
The Communications Authority ofKenya and the Central Bank ofKenya (The I", 2nd, 3rd and
4th respondents respectively) plays the crucial role of showcasing Kenya's current state of
data protection regulation. Moreover, it highlights the various measures undertaken by local
legislation to protect the nation's data integrity and the interaction of these local measures
with international standards.
The basis for the Petition lay on the introduction of a new technology by the 2nd Respondent
known as Thin SIM (Subscriber Identity Module) Technology which entails overlaying a
SIM card on a pre-existing SIM card belonging to a third party . The thin SIM sits between





allegedly has visibility of all communications taking place between the primary SIM and the
mobile handset.
It was therefore the Petitioner's case that if the Respondents are not restrained from the roll
out of the Thin SIM technology, the security of his personal data would not be guaranteed
and in his Petition dated 10th October, 2014, he has sought the following orders ;
a) That the Honorable Court be pleased to issue a declaration that Article 31(c) and 31(d) is
in force and is mandatory that for its realization a data protection law be enacted.
b) A conservatory order be issued restraining the 1st Respondent and 2nd Respondent from
rolling out the thin sim technology pending the enactment of a data protection law.
c) A conservatory order be issued restraining the 3rd Respondent & 4th Respondent from
issuing any decision or directive in respect to the thin sim technology rollout by the 1st
and 2nd Respondents pending the final determination of this case.
d) That the Honorable Court be pleased to award the Petitioners costs of and incidental to
these proceedings.
e) The Honourable Court be pleased to make any order as it seems just."
A. The Petitioner's submissions:
• The petitioner deponed that he was an account holder with the 2nd Respondent
and was a member of the public whose personal data is held by the 2nd
Respondent. That the Thin SIM technology worked by making the Thin SIM sit
between the microchip of the primary SIM card and the SIM card socket of a
mobile phone handset and has visibility of all communications taking place
between the Primary SIM and the mobile handset thus exposing it to man-in-the-
middle attacks including personal data contamination and access by third Parties.
He also pointed out that the Thin SIM is also capable of remote communication
through its contactless communication capabilities, thus enhancing its general
capabilities. r'"
• He also averred that the Global System for Mobile Communication Association
(GSMA) is an association and not a regulatory body and therefore the 1st and 2nd





Respondents needed to undertake further regulatory measures before the roll out
of the Thin SIM and not merely rely on GSMA's approval of the same. He
maintained that the Thin SIM had security vulnerabilities and the 3rd Respondent
had placed a tender for consultancy services to undertake evaluation performance
and security features on the Thin SIM in appreciation of that fact.227
• It was his further position that the Thin SIM technology has not been used in
Countries with large scale money transfer services and in countries where the
Thin SIM technology has been used, data protection laws have been enacted.
228As regards the current money banking services, he stated that the 2nd
Respondent has been using existing GSM services and not the Thin SIM
technology to provide those services.229
• He also claimed that countries that have been said to use the Thin SIM primarily
use it for voice and data roaming services and not large scale mobile money
transfer services as is proposed in Kenya.23o
Further, that the roll out of the Thin SIM technology has been halted by the
Parliamentary Committee on Energy and Information and Communication based
on privacy and data protection and this Court ought to do the same
• Mr. Kirwa presented the Petitioner's case and submitted that the thin SIM
technology as manifested from its functionality, provided a real threat to the
Petitioner's enjoyment of his rights under Article 31 (c) and (d) of the
Constitution in so far as his personal data is concerned. That his fears are founded
on the security vulnerabilities of the Thin SIM which transcends the scope of the
user by making it possible for personal and sensitive data such as PIN numbers.
He also submitted that due diligence was not conducted before introducing the
thin SIM and that had that been done, then the issue of the functionality of the
thin SIM would have been detected from its patent and used encryption keys to be
accessed by third parties, to his prejudice.
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228petition No. 503 of 2014, para. 2
229petition No. 503 of 2014, para. 2






• On the competence of the Petition, he claimed that the issues raised in the Petition
are real and not hypothetical as alleged by the Respondents. That the Court had
the jurisdiction to defend the Constitution and to inquire into the threat of
violation of right to privacy and under international law, Kenya has an obligation
to adopt legislative and other measures to give effect to the prohibition against
interferences and attacks to the protection of the right to privacy. That in
recognition to that role, the Attorney General has published the Data Protection
Bill 2012, whose objects are clear but has yet to become law.
It was Mr. Kirwa's further submission that Parliament had halted the roll out of
the thin SIM technology pending satisfaction as to its security and functionality.
That the 3rd Respondent cannot defy Parliament as the latter exercises oversight
over it, and further submitted.that Parliament was justified in halting the roll out
as guardians of public interest.
Counsel for the petition also submitted that the violations of the Petitioner 's right
to privacy and consumer protection are constitutional issues which this Court is
enjoined to safeguard and protect and that recourse for violation of constitutional
rights lies to the High Court and not a tribunal as alleged by the Respondents. He
thus submitted that the doctrine of constitutional avoidance did not apply in this
Petition and that the Court should exercise its powers and strike a balance to
ensure that the constitutional safeguards in Article 31(c) and 31 (d) of the
Constitution are upheld.
B. The Court's Determination:
With relevance to the dissertation topic, the following three paint points of data protection
regulation were addressed by the Court in this matter. First, the Court pointed out the various
dispute resolution mechanisms made available by statute in the event of such a petition.
Secondly, the Court determined the petitioner's right to institute proceedings against the
respondents, and finally, the COUli asserted whether the petitioner's right to privacy was
indeed violated, or under impending threat of violation.23 I






i) Whether there are alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in the event of such a
petition:
The Respondents submitted that this COUli has no jurisdiction to determine the Petition
because the dispute herein is one which ought to be determined by the Appeals Tribunal
created under the Kenya Information and Communication (Amendment) Act, 2013 and also
the dispute resolution mechanism established under the Consumer Protection Act, 2012. The
Court asserted that there existed an Appeals Tribunal, established under Section 102( 1) of the
Kenya Communications Act which provides as follows;
"There shall be established an Appeals Tribunal for the purpose of arbitrating in cases
where disputes arise between the parties under this Act and such matters as may be referred
to it by the Minister ".
The Court further stated that there exists a chain of authorities from the High Court as well as
the Court of Appeal that: where a statute has provided a remedy to a party, this COUli must
exercise restraint and first give an opportunity to the relevant bodies or State organs to deal
with the dispute as provided in the relevant statute. This principle was well articulated by the
Court of Appeal in Speaker ofNational Assembly v Njenga Karume [2008/32, where it held
that;
"In our view there is considerable merit.....that where there is clear procedure for the redress
of any particular grievance prescribed by the Constitution or an Act of Parliament, that
procedure should be strictly followed. ,,233
The same principle has been underlined in the cases of Kipkalya Kones v Republic & Another
exparte Kimani Wanyoike & 4 Others (2008) 3 KLR (EP) 291, Francis Gitau Parsimei & 2
Others v National Alliance Party & 4 Others Petition No.356 and 359 of2012.
Further, the Court stated that it was bound to follow that principle of law since it flows from
the other important principle that not each and every violation of the law must be raised
before the High Court as a constitutional issue. Where there exists an alternative remedy
232Speaker of National Assembly v Njenga Karume [2008)1 KLR 425,




through statutory law, then it is desirable that such a statutory remedy should be pursued
first.234
The Court also considered the jurisprudence from the case of Damian Belfonte v The
Attorney General ofTrinidad and Tobago (2004/35, which stated that where there is a means
of redress that is inadequate, the Court should not exercise restraint. The Court stated that;
"The opinion in Jaroo has recently been considered and clarified by the Board in A.G vs
Ramanoop. Their lordships laid stress on the need to examine the purpose for which the
application is made in order to determine whether it is an abuse ofprocess where there is an
available common law remedy. In their lordship 's words: "Where there is a parallel
remedy, constitutional relief should not be sought unless the circumstances of which the
complaint is made include some feature which makes itappropriate to take that course. As a
general rule, there must be some feature, which, at least arguably, indicates that the means
of legal redress otherwise available would not be adequate. To seek constitutional relief in
theabsence ofsuch a feature would be amisuse, or abuse, of the Court 's process. Atypical,
but by no means exclusive, example ofsuch a feature would be a case where there has been
an arbitrary use ofstate power. Another example ofa special feature would be a case where
several rights are infringed, some of which are common law rights and some for which
protection is available only under the constitution. It would not be fair, convenient or
conducive to the proper administration ofjustice to require an applicant to abandon his
constitutional remedy or to file separate actions for the vindication ofhis rights ". "
Drawing from these sentiments, The Court asserted its mandate to examine whether the
alternative remedy provides an efficacious and satisfactory answer to the litigant's grievance.
In that regard, the Petitioner had filed this Petition pursuant to the provisions of Articles 22,
23 and 165(3) (b) of the Constitution which grants every person the right to institute Court
234 SeeHarrikinson v Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (1980) AC 265, where the court concluded thus,
'The mere allegation that a human right has been or is likely to be contravened is not itself sufficient to entitle the
applicant to invoke the jurisdiction of the court under the section if it is apparent that the allegation is frivolous,
vexatious or abuse of the process of court, as being made solely for the purpose of avoiding the necessity of
applying the normal way for appropriate judicial remedy for unlawful administrative action which involves no
contravention of any human right or fundamental freedom."




proceedings claiming that a right or fundamental freedom has been violated or is threatened
with an infringement. That right, to access this Court, could thus not be impeded or stifled in
a manner that frustrates the enforcement of fundamental rights and freedoms except in the
circumstances noted in Belfonte.236
Hence, the Court pointed out that the question brought before the Court was not whether the
rollout of thin-Sllvl technology is proper or not but whether that action would violate the
Petitioner's rights under Articles 31 and 46 of the Constitution, (right to private and
consumer rights, respectively). The mandate and jurisdiction to determine that question lies
in this Court under Articles 22, 23(3) and 165(3) (d) of the Constitution. This effectively
meant that the Appeals Tribunal established under the Kenya Information and
Communication Act does not have the jurisdiction to determine alleged violations of the
Constitution. This position was also asserted by the Court in the case of Wananchi Group
(Kenya) Ltd v The Communications Commission ofKenya.237
In conclusion, the Court referred to the judgement of Majanja J J in Isaac Ngugi v Nairobi
Hospital and Another238 stated as follows;
"For instance, the Court will be reluctant to apply the Constitution directly to horizontal
relationships where specific legislation exists to regulate the private relations in questions.
In other cases, the mechanisms providedfor enforcement are simply inadequate to effectuate
the Constitutional guarantee even though there exists private law regulating a matter within
the scope of the Application of the Constitutional right or fundamental freedoms. In
suchcases, the Court may proceed to apply the provisions ofthe Constitution directly. "
in Whether the petitioner is a proper party to these proceedings:
It was the 2nd Respondent's submission that the Petitioner did not have any interest in the
rolling out of the Thin 81M technology capable of protection by the Court, as he was not an
account holder with the 2nd Respondent and as such he could not to be affected by the said
236 Petition No. 503 of 2014, para. 3
237WananchiGroup (Kenya) Ltd v The Communications Commission ofKenya Petition No.98 of 2012




Thin SIM technology. The Court however rebutted this assumption by asserting that the
Petitioner did not need to act on his behalf in order to institute court proceedings to establish
that tenets of the Constitution have been contravened or are in threat of contravention. The
latter is expressly stated by Article 258(2).
As such the Court held that the Petitioner was accorded the right to institute such proceedings
by the Constitution itself, in this regard, Lenaola J. expressly stated:
"In the totality ofevidence before me, while I am inclined to find that the Petitioner is not an
account holder with the 2nd Respondent, under Article 258 (2) he can institute Court
proceedings claiming a violation ofthe Constitution generally and even in the public interest.
He alleged in that regard that the present Petition has been filed on behalf of all account
holders with the 2nd Respondent and whose information/data is subject to compromise and
contamination through the use of the Thin 81M technology. If that is the case, I do not see
any valid reason as to why I should find that the Petitioner is not the right party in these
proceedings.
ill} Whether the right of privacy is in threat of violation:
The Court noted that the Petitioner did not challenge the issuance of the license to the 1st and
2nd Respondent and did not even challenge powers of the 3rd and 4th Respondents over the
Thin SIM technology. The Court further noted that it did not hear the Petitioner accuse the 4th
Respondent of any wrong doing. His case would therefore be seen through the prism of the
alleged threat of right to privacy as provided for under Article 31 of the Constitution.
In that regard, he claimed that the rolling out of the Thin SIM technology would violate his
right to privacy as it is suspect to interception and contamination of the primary SIM data.
That was the issue that ran throughout his submissions and all other issues raised rotated
around that singular complaint.
The Court noted that the right to privacy is provided for under Article 31 of the Constitution
in the following manner;




a. Theirperson, house or property searched;
b. Theirpossessions seized;
c. Information relating to their family or private affairs unnecessarily required or revealed;
or
d. Theprivacy oftheir communications infringed.
In making its determination, the Court sought insight from the Irish Supreme COUli in
Kennedy vs Ireland (1987/39, who in addressing the said right, held that phone-tapping
violated the right to privacy. Hamilton J made it clear in that case that the right to privacy
must ensure the preservation of the dignity and freedom of the individual in a sovereign,
independent and democratic society. In his view;
"The dignity and freedom of an individual in a democratic society cannot be ensured if his
communication of a private nature, be they written or telephonic, are deliberately,
consciously and unjustifiably intruded upon and interfered with. "
The Court also drew insight from the decision in CORD v Attorney General (supra) which
held that surveillance and intercepting of communication violated the right to privacy. The
Court expressed itself as follows;
"We are clear in our minds that surveillance in terms ofintercepting communication impacts
upon the privacy of a person by leaving the individual open to .the threat of constant
exposure. This infringes on the privacy ofthe person by allowing others to intrude on his or
her personal space and exposing his private zone. "
With these principles in mind, the Court then turned to determine whether the right of
privacy was in any impending threat of violation. The starting point was seen to be the
Affidavit of Perminus Karungu where he explained that the Thin SIM technology entailed
the issuance of a paper Thin SIM card that was embedded with a chip whereby users thereof
would overlay it on their primary SIM card, regardless of network and has the capability of a





dual SIM phone without having an actual dual SIM phone. The 1st and 2nd Respondents also
averred in the Affidavit of John Waweru that the Thin SIM only relies on the primary SIM
for anchorage and space in the mobile handset and does not technically have the capacity to
interfere or intercept the services or connections of the Primary SIM. Further, that it was
incapable of remotely connecting to outside sources for additional resource without the
knowledge of the user.
In determining the true and factual position regarding the technical aspects of the case, the
Court would resort to the answers given by the 3rd Respondent since it is the body established
under the Kenya Information and Communication Act, to undertake licensing and regulation
of telecommunication as well as radio communications and postal ' services in Kenya. In
addressing that issue, the 3rd Respondent engaged licensed Mobile Network Operators and
Mobile Virtual Network Operators in a discussion with a view to making a decision on the
matter; It also enjoined the 4th Respondent in the discussion due to the complaint touching on
mobile money transfer services. In addressing the said issue it also scrutinized the Taiwanese
Company, Taisys Technologies Company Ltd which manufactures the Thin SIM. It went
further and obtained the opinion of the GSMA, an association of mobile operators and related
companies devoted to supporting the standardizing, deployment and promotion of the GSM
mobile telephone system, which recommended that before the Thin SIM card could be used
in the market, the 3rd Respondent should ensure the following;
"(a) Promoters and issuers of the thin SIM card should provide assurances on verification
ofthe modes applied to mitigate the risks.
(b)That the overlay SIM technology should have been independently analyzed and certified
as being free from any functionality capable ofundermining the security ofusers and issuers
ofthe small original SIMs; and
(c) Mobile phone users should be advised of the potential dangers that could result from
inserting unapproved elements in their devices and they should be provided with assurances





Following the above opinion, the 3rd Respondent benchmarked the Thin SIM against various
standards, organizations and regulatory experts and carried out research to find out the global
practices concerning the overlay SIM technology. Counsel for the 3rd Respondent explained
that it established the following;
"(a) [The] 81M overlay technology was developed nearly 10 years ago in China as a multi-
operator access solution and it was primarily designed to avoid roamingfees;
(b) As a roaming tool, the Thin 81M card will elect to become the primary 81M card while
roaming thus interfacing with local carriers at rates far better than the primary carrier;
c. The Canadian company, Roamly and American Company, Know Roaming, use the same
technology presently to offer a low cost roaming service for their customers;
d. In China particularly the technology is additionally being usedforjinancial services;
e. Research showed that the 81M overlay technology used in mobile banking was safe since it
used the 8M8 channel as opposed to the modern mobile applications over internet; and
f Further, it emerged that the technology is operational in both smart andfunctional phones
thus easily available to low income clients. "
Following the above report, the 4th Respondent held a stakeholder conference at the
Authority'S offices and the participants included the four Mobile Network Operators in
Kenya i.e Safaricom, Airtel Kenya, Yu Mobile and Orange Telkom, the 1st Respondent, the
2nd Respondent and Taisys Technologies among others. It was observed in that stakeholder
conference that;
" (i) The Thin 81M complies with all minimum mandatory international standards pertaining
to the manufacturing ofthe Thin 81M;
it. No major complaints particularly none on interception oftraffic ofthe primary 81M card





iii. Tests conducted on Taisys Thin SIM by China National Computer Quality Supervising
Test Center as well as the Bank Card Test Centre ojChina show that the Thin SIM complies
with applicable ISO and European Telecommunications Standards Institute standards; and
iv. Based on the opinion oj GSMA, save for the inherent vulnerabilities oj all SIM cards,
there are no specific and confirmed vulnerabilities arisingfrom the use ojthe ThinS1M "
On the basis of the above findings, the 3rd Respondent decided as follows;
"(a) There were no sufficient grounds that can hinder the entry oj the Thin SIM into the
Kenyan market.
b. The Authority will allow the use ojthe Thin SIM technology under strict observation for a
period oj one year. During his period, only Taisy's Thin SIM will operate in the Kenyan
market;
(c) The Authority will hire an internationally reputable firm to conduct a security audit on
all SIM cards and in particular the use oj the Thin SIM in mobile money transfer services,
and recommend a framework for regulating the use ojSIM card in Kenya during this period;
(d) During the one year testing period, if any vulnerability is discovered from the use oj
Taisy 's Thin SIM card, then operations ofthe Thin SIM card in the Kenyan market will cease
immediately pending the final recommendations from the security report; and
(e) Operators intending to use the Thin SIM for mobile money transJers must obtain
authorization from Central Bank ojKenya. "
Perminus Karungu, Counsel for the 3rd Respondent therefore deponed that the 3rd
Respondent's authority to grant a limited approval for the use of the Thin SIM card was also
in tandem with the advice of GSMA in the following manner;
• Allowing the use of the Thin SIM cards manufactured by Taisy's Technologies as the
same had been independently verified and found to comply with the standards




Its use would be under strict observation of internationally reputable financial
security firm; and
• All the entities that would use the Thin SIM card we8re required to provide
assurances that they have put in place the requisite security measures and to that end,
it has made it mandatory for the said entities to provide an undertaking indemnifying
not only the authority for any liabilities that may be confirmed but also, the entities
are required to meet any liabilities suffered by consumers who experience
manipulation or blocking of communications of the Primary card.
The Court asserted that the 3rd Respondent, as a regulator, had already resolved a complaint
similar to the one before it regarding the use of Thin SIM technology. The Court also
emphasized that the 3rd Respondent as the regulator of Mobile Network Operators and Mobile
Network Virtual Operators and the 4th Respondent as the regulator of mobile banking in Kenya
are the best judges to determine the merits pertaining to the complaint made now by the
Petitioner and not the Court. Parliament has set out the law and the power of formulating policy
in respect to regulating communication and has conferred such power to the 3rd Respondent and
mobile banking to the 4th Respondent and it would be wrong, according to the Court for it to
intervene as to the merits of the decision already made by the 3rd and 4th Respondents as the
Regulators. The Court stated that it could only intervene in very limited circumstances and in the
clearest of cases for instance where it is being alleged that there is abuse of discretion, or that the
decision makers have exercised their discretion for an improper purpose or have acted unfairly or
in excess of their statutory mandate, which was not the case in the petition brought before it. Its
verdict was in accordance with the Republic v The Council ofLegal Education ex parte James
Njuguna and 14 Others.z4o
Therefore, The Court pointed out that it was not demonstrated that the 3rd Respondent exercised
its powers arbitrarily. On the contrary, The Court was satisfied that the decision it reached was
made pursuant to its mandate which is within the letter, the purpose and objects of the Kenya
Information and Communication Act including the applicable Regulations. That being so, the






Court had no reason to intervene in a manner that interfered with the merit of a decision clearly
falling within the relevant statutory agency without allegations of any irregularities on its part. It
therefore followed that from the findings of all the technical bodies named in the Petition, the
Thin SIM technology was deemed safe in banking as proposed and any risks would be dealt with
by the relevant bodies. Moreover, measures were undertaken by the 3rd Respondent wherein the
Thin SIM technology would undergo strict surveillance by an internationally reputable financial
security firm for a period of one year. During the latter period, there existed an indemnification
process in the event ofloss or injury due to the use of the Thin SIM techn?logy by consumers.
As such, the Court found that the alleged threat to the right of privacy has not been proven and
the Petitioner's complaints in that regard were summarily dismissed.
In his ratio, Justice Lenaola J stated:
"Lastly, I do not see any reason and I have said why above that I should halt the roll out ofthe
Thin 81M technology pending the enactment ofthe Data Protection Bill into law. This Court can
only interfere with the legislative process of Parliament especially before Parliament has
concluded its deliberations on a Bill in very rare cases. The issue whether a data protection law
is necessary as a safeguard to the use of the Thin 81M is not one such case. This Court cannot
order Parliament to make specific laws but only test both the process leading to those laws and
their contents against the constitutional muster. What has been placed before this Court is a
Billand in that case it is not clear what the end result of that Bill would be and I will therefore
exercisejudicial restraint and avoid making any orders in that regard. ,,24 /
The conclusion of the Court's judgement notably asserted the lack of data protection regulation
within current Kenyan legislation, however, a Data Protection Bill is in the pipeline and may
play the crucial role of entrenching data protection regulation and practice within our
jurisdiction. It is fundamental to note that the constitutionality of any regulations so passed by
Parliament can be reviewed by the able arm of the Judiciary and as such any data protection
regulation that may harm or threaten the fundamental rights of any Kenyan citizen can be





withdrawn from adjudication in the Kenyan courts. As such, the Judiciary remains a sentinel to
the data integrity of her citizens.
3. The African Union Convention on Personal Data Regulation and Cybercrime:
Insights into the imminent African Data Protection Regime:
1. Introduction:
The adoption of digital technologies within the African continent and the proliferation of data-
centric businesses in Africa has not gone unnoticed by Member States of the African Union.
According to the Preamble of the African Union Convention on Personal Data Regulation and
Cybercrime, the Convention was drafted in fulfilment of the intention to create the African
Union's Information Society, a body which is intended to strengthen existing legislations on
Information and Communication Technologies of Member States and their respective economic
communities. Further, the Convention was drafted in order to establish the appropriate regulatory
framework on cyber-security and personal data protection takes into account the requirements of
respect for the rights of citizens, guaranteed under the fundamental texts of domestic law and
protected by international human rights Conventions and Treaties, particularly the African
'Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.242
The Member States of the African Union also enacted data protection regulations in order to
facilitate the development of the knowledge economy within Africa. In its Preamble, the
Convention highlights the major obstacles to the development of electronic commerce in Africa
are linked to security issues, particularly the gaps affecting the regulation of legal recognition of
data communications and electronic signature; the absence of specific 'legal rules that protect
consumers, intellectual property rights, personal data and information systems; the absence of e-
services and telecommuting legislations; the application of electronic techniques to commercial







and administrative acts; the probative elements introduced by digital techniques (time stamping,
certification, etc.); the rules applicable to cryptology devices and services; the oversight of on-
line advertising and the absence of appropriate fiscal and customs legislations for electronic
commerce. 243
Fundamentally, the Member States of the Union drafted the Convention due to the urgent need to
establish a mechanism to address the dangers and risks deriving from the use of electronic data
and individual records, with a view to respecting privacy and freedoms while enhancing the
promotion and development of lCTs in the Member States of the African Union . It can thus be
concluded that the goal of the Convention is to address the need for harmonized legislation in the
area of cyber security in Member States of the African Union, and to establish in each State party
a mechanism capable of combating violations of privacy that may be generated by personal data
collection, processing, transmission, storage and use. The Convention meets this end by
proposing a type of institutional basis, wherein the Convention guarantees that whatever form of
processing is used shall respect the basic freedoms and rights of individuals while also taking
into account the prerogatives of States, the rights of local communities and the interests of
businesses.r" Finally the Convention seeks to necessitate the adoption of internationally
recognized best practices in order to guarantee the data integrity of the Member States'
citizens245.
2. The principles of data protection regulation present in the AU Convention on
Personal Data Protection and Cybercrime:
I. The establishment ofNational Personal Data Protection Authorities:
Under Article 11 of the Convention, Each State Party shall establish an authority in charge of
protecting personal data. The national protection authority should be an independent
administrative authority with the task of ensuring that the processing of personal data is
conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Convention. The national protection authority
is expected to inform its citizens and the processing officials of their rights and obligations.
243Preamble of the African Union Convention on Personal Data Regulation and Cybercrime
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Further, each State Party is free to determine the composition of the ,national personal data
protection authority. Note that the latter occurs without prejudice to Article 11.6, which points
out that membership of the national protection authority should be incompatible with
membership of Government, carrying out the functions of business executive and ownership of
shares in businesses within the information and communication technologies sector. 246
Without prejudice to national legislations, members of the national data protection authority are
expected to enjoy full immunity for opinions expressed in the pursuit, or in connection with the
pursuit of their duties. Members of the national protection authority shall not receive instructions
from any other authority in the performance of their duties. The latter tenets are meant to
guarantee the independence of the data protection authority from the undue pressures of the State
government, in order to guarantee the safety of the fundamental rights of Member States'
citizens. Note that this clause can be limited by the legislation present in local jurisdictions.
Article 12 of the Convention outlines the various duties and powers of national data protection
authorities within Member States' local jurisdiction. According to Article 12, the national
protection authorities are expected to ensure that the processing of personal data is consistent
with the provisions of this Convention within State Parties of the African Union. The national
protection authorities have the mandate to ensure that Information and Communication
Technologies do not constitute a threat to public freedoms and the private life of citizens. To this
end, they are responsible for:
• Responding to every request for an opinion regarding personal data processing;
• Informing the persons concerned and data controllers of their rights and
obligations;
• In a number of cases, authorize the processing of data files, particularly sensitive
files;
• Receiving the preliminary formalities for personal data processing;
• Entertaining claims, petitions and complaints regarding the processmg of
personal data and informing the authors of the results thereof;




• Speedily informing the judicial authority of certain types of offences that have
come to their attention ;
• Undertaking the audit of all processed personal data, through its officials or
sworn officials;
• Imposing administrative and monetary sanctions on data controllers;
• Updating a processed personal data directory that is accessible to the public;
• Advising persons and bodies engaged in personal data processing or in carrying
out tests and experiments likely to result in data processing;
• Authorizing trans-border transfer of personal data;
• Making suggestions that could simplify and improve legislative and regulatory
frameworks for data processing;
• Establishing mechanisms for cooperation with the personal data protection
authorities of third countries;
• Participating in international negotiations on personal data protection;
• Preparing an activity report in accordance with a well-defined periodicity, for
submission to the appropriate authorities of the State Party.247
Further, in the event of breach of data protection standards and regulations, the national
protection authorities may decide on the following measures ; the issuance of warning to any data
controller that fails to comply with the obligations resulting from this Convention or the issuance
of an official warning letter to stop such breaches within a timefrarne set by the authority. Where
the data controller fails to comply with the official warning letter addressed to him/her, the
national protection authority may impose the following sanctions after adversarial proceedings:
temporary withdrawal of the authorization granted; pennanent withdrawal of the authorization or
a monetary fine.
In cases of emergency, where the processing or use of personal data results in violation of
fundamental rights and freedoms, the national protection authority may, after adversarial
proceedings, decide as follows: Discontinuation of data processing; Blocking of some of the




personal data processed; Temporary or permanent prohibition of any processing at variance with
the provisions of this Convention. Note that, as per Article 12, the sanctions imposed and
decisions taken by national protection authorities are subject to appeal.
II. The principle of consent and legitimacy of data processing: 248
According to Article 13, the processing of personal data shall be deemed to be legitimate where
the data subject has given his/her consent. This requirement of consent may however be waived
where the processing is necessary for:
a) Compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject;
b) Performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority
vested in the controller or in a third party to whom the data are disclosed;
c) Performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the
request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract;
d) Protect the vital interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject.
III. The principle of lawfulness and fairness of personal data processing: 249
According to Article 13 of the Convention, The collection, recording, processing, storage and
transmission of personal data should be undertaken lawfully, fairly and non-fraudulently.
IV. The principle of purpose. relevance and storage of processed personal data250:
In accordance with Article 13 of the Convention, Data collection shall be ~ndertaken for specific,
explicit and legitimate purposes, and not further processed in a way incompatible with those
purposes. Data collection should be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the
purposes for which they are collected and further processed. Data should be kept for no longer
than is necessary for the purposes for which the data were collected or further processed.
Beyond the required period, data may be stored only for the specific needs of data processing
248 Article 13 of the African Union Convention on Personal Data Regulation and Cybercrime.
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undertaken for historical, statistical or research purposes under the law.
V. Principle of accuracy of personal data:251
Data collected should be accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date. Every reasonable step
must be taken to ensure that data which are inaccurate or incomplete, having regard to the
purposes for which they were collected or for which they are further processed, are erased or
rectified.
VI. Principle of transparency of personal data processing:252
The principle of transparency requires mandatory disclosure of information on personaldata by
the data controller.
VII. Principle of confidentiality and security of personal data processing: 253
a) Personal data shall be processed confidentially and protected, in particular where the
processing involves transmission of the data over a network;
b) Where processing is undertaken on behalf of a controller, the latter shall choose a processor
providing sufficient guarantees. It is incumbent on the controller and processor to ensure
compliance with the security measures defined in this Convention.
VIII. The processing of sensitive data254:
In accordance with Article 14 of the Convention, State Parties are expected to actively prohibit
any data collection and processing revealing racial, ethnic and regional origin, parental filiation,
political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade union membership, sex life and
genetic information or, more generally, data on the state of health of the data subject.
However, the latter statute cannot be applied to categories where:
251Article 13 of the African Union Convention on Personal Data Regulation and Cybercrime
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Processing relates to data which are manifestly made public by the data subject ;
• The data subject has given his/her written consent, by any means, to the processing and in
conformity with extant texts.
• Processing is necessary to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another
person where the data subject is physically or legally incapable of giving his/her consent;
Processing, particularly of genetic data, is required for the establishment, exercise or
defense of legal claims;
• A judicial procedure or criminal investigation has been instituted ; .
• Processing is necessary in the public interest, especially for historical, statistical or
scientific purposes;
• Processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is
party to or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a
contract;
• Processing is necessary for compliance with a legal or regulatory obligation to which the
controller is subject ;
Processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or
in the exercise of official authority or assigned by a public authority vested in the
controller or in a third party to whom data are disclosed;
Processing is carried out in the course of the legitimate activities of a foundation,
association or any other non-profit making body with a political, philosophical, religious,
cooperative or trade union aim, and on condition that the processing relates solely to the
members of the body or to persons who have regular contact with it in connection with its
purposes and that the data are not disclosed to a third party without the consent of the
data subjects
The Convention, under Article 14, legislates that personal data processing for journalistic
purposes or for the purpose of research or artistic or literary expression shall be acceptable where
the processing is solely for literary and artistic expression or for professional exercise of
journalistic or research activity, in accordance with the code of conduct of these professions.




') not preclude the application of national legislations with regard to the print media or the audio-
visual sector, as well as the provisions of the criminal code which provide for the conditions for
exercise of the right of reply, and which prevent, limit, compensate for and, where necessary,
repress breaches of privacy and damage to personal reputation.
According to Article 14.5 of the Convention , A person should not be subject to a decision which
produces legal effects concerning him/her or significantly affects him/her.to a substantial degree,
which is based solely on automated processing of data intended to evaluate certain personal
aspects relating to him/her.
Crucially, the data controller should not transfer personal data to a non-Member State of the
African Union unless such a State ensures an adequate level of protection of the privacy,
freedoms and fundamental rights of persons whose data are being or are likely to be processed.
The previous prohibition is not applicable where, before any personal data is transferred to the
third country, the data controller has requested authorization for such transfer from the national
protection authority.
" Conclusion:
An analysis of the Convention reveals principles that remain at the heart of data protection laws
to this day. In some respects, given that consistency is a quality much respected in law, this is a
benefit. If consideration is given, however, to developments in computer technology in the last
decade, problems may be identified. The Convention, a reflection of the current data protection
law sourced principally from the Recommendations of the Council of Europe to the European
. .
Commission, is substantially based on the notion of a single controller with a single computer
holding data.255 This bears little resemblance to today's networked environment. In particular,
reactive controls may not be sufficient. Once inaccurate data has found its way onto the Internet,
the damage can never be undone. The initial Council of Europe resolutions did not attempt to
prescribe the means by which Member States should give effect to the principles contained
therein. As more and more European countries enacted data protection legislation, so too did the
problems resulting from the international trade of information (frequently referred to as




transborder data flows) become more acute. The latter may be Africa 's lot in the event that
legislation governing transborder data flow is not better legislated against by the emergent Data
Protection regime.
An apparent loophole in the Convention often criticised by human rights advocates can be seen
in Article 14, which outlines that personal data should only be processed where the data subjects
give express, unequivocal, free, specific, and informed consent.256 However, the Convention
adds an ominous exception , which outlines that such data protection can be limited in the case
where access is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the
exercise of official authority vested in the controller or in a third party to whom the data are
disclosed. Given African States' putrid history of corruption and civic oppression, the latter may
effectively empower governments to access sensitive data regarding State citizens for political
reasons, or in the case of the justice system within the State, the deletion of evidence from
private and public databases whose data may bear evidence implicating government agents






CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
A. Recommendations:
Following the various observations made by this paper, regarding the data protection regime in
Africa and its effect of cloud-based technologies , this section will seek to offer recommendations
that will better prepare the African Union for the integration and regulation of data-centric cloud-
based technologies into their economies.
The recommendations has been divided into two sections. The first section regards cross-border
data transfers whereby European law may offer valuable insights regarding regulation and
restriction methods that can be assimilated into the current African Union data protection regime.
The second section intends to highlight the shortcomings of the current EU data protection
regime, whose principles are present in the AU Convention, in order to draw remedial
information on the disabilities of the currently designed data protection regime.
1. Data Transfers & Their Regulation:
An often understated feature of data protection, particularly in past legislative regimes, is the
dynamic field of data transfers and their impact on emergent technologies. The interaction of
data transfers and data protection is altogether problematic , as the globalization of the digital
market needs to the use, sharing and application of different types of data across different
jurisdictions the probability of export of illegal data continues to grow. In Europe, the Data
Protection Directive and the Article 29 Working Party (A29WP) work hand in hand to ensure
comprehensive data transfer through the European Economic Area.257 This section will seek to
unravel the various restrictions outlined by the Directive in order to outline a proper course of
action for the adoption of data protection regulation in Africa.
Under Article 25(1), subject to certain derogations under Article 26,258 Member States are
forbidden from allowing a data controller to export personal data due to a ' third country ' outside
the European Economic Area, unless the country is seen to provide an adequate level of
257Millard C. Cloud Computing Law, Oxford Publishing Press (2013), p. 254




" protection for personal data , meaning a standard in keeping the Data Protection Directive's main
principles. The latter applies whether the data are kept within the same entity, such as a
subsidiary, or transferred to a company in the same group or an unrelated third party within the
given jurisdiction.P" The European Commission rationalized this tenet, as being fundamental to
the adoption of data protection standards outside the European Economic Area. It is worth noting
that this is an additional requirement, as a data export or transfer ' essentially constitutes
'processing' , for which a legal justification is required according to the principles of data
protection elaborated under Chapter 3, such as the data subject consent to processing, even where
export is permitted under a derogation under Article 26.260 It is the opinion of the writer that
such a clause be inserted into the AU Convention on Protection of Personal Data and
Cybercrime, wherein Member States are necessitated to adopt necessary adequacy requirements,
as defined by the Convention. Moreover, the ban on data export should be implemented upon
subsidiaries acting in Member States. Companies in default of this requirement should face
punitive and where applicable, criminal liability in instances where they can be held to be liable
to data export offences.
Under Article 25(6) of the Data Protection Directive, the European Commission can declare that
certain States outside the European Economic Area have reached the adequacy standards set out
by the Directive, and can thus receive personal data freely.261 Examples of such countries
include; Andorra, Argentina, Jersey , Israel , Guernsey, Isle of Man, New Zealand, Switzerland
and Uruguay262. It is interesting to note that France and Spain have given their national data
protection authorities the powers to make their own adequacy findings. The adjudication of such
powers is immensely rare , moreover, no State has issued adequacy findings for countries not
already declared as such by the European Commission.f'" In applying these findings to the case
of the AU Convention, the writer would recommend the use of these differentiated standards
according to market needs, by designing a benchmark as offered by the fundamental principles
259 Kuner Christopher, Transborder Data Flows and Data Privacy Law. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) . P. 25
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present in the Convention, while balancing the latter against local statutes that may outline
differentiated market needs.
Notably, the adequacy standards set by the Directive are explicitly defined as outlined by Article
25. However, in the African Union Convention on Personal Data Protection and Cybercrime ,
adequacy standards have not been so determined and as such can be a thorn in the side of
national data protection regulators.i'" The latter may lead to the fragmentation of data protection
regulations and differentiated standards. The latter may lead to slowed e-commerce activity and
high transactional costs, hindering economic growth. Moreover, in the event of breach of data
export restrictions, miscreants may escape justice due to the lack of set standards.
It is crucial to note that numerous cloud arrangements use remote data storage and other data
processing, such that the geographic location of data and lor operations may ' change' as may
'change' as data may be replicated to equipment located in other countries, including third
countries.265 Therefore , the data export restriction within the current 'global data protection
regime, poses significant problems to cloud providers , whose transactions by their nature
involves data transfers from user to cloud {and vice versa), and automated data transfers within
the cloud266. This technical reality could result in legal problems for data controllers established
outside the EEA. This is because the Directive applies through Article (4)(1) not only to
processing in the context of an EU establishment but also where a data controller based outside
the ED is using 'equipment' or 'means' such as a cookie on the user's computer, or is using an
EEA data centre or EEA provideri'". These provisions thus develop a critical situation whereby a
cloud provider with no establishment in the EEA may be subject to the ED data export regime
when attempting to transfer data back from the EEA to its place of establishment or some other
location outside the EEA, even if the data were originally collected outside the EEA and relates
to non-EEA individuals. The inevitable result is that the Directive may ultimately lock out non-
EEA cloud providers offering their services remotely to users in the EEA, unless they comply
264European Commission, 'Commission decisions on adequacy of the protection of personal data in third
countries.'
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.-~.- with their adequacy requirements. Moreover, the enforceability ofthese EU Data Protection laws
in practice seem questionable. The implication of these statutes in the sale of non-EEA
technologies within the EEA seems adversely affected, as providers face stringent measures from
local and regional data protection regulators prior to accessing the European Digital Market. In
this regard, the writer opines that the development of model clauses within non-EEA provider
enterprises will serve a fundamental function in allowing for their participation in the European
Digital Market. Article 26 (4) provides that if a transfer of data to outside the EEA is made under
the contractual clauses the terms of which have been approved by the European Commission for
this purpose, the protection is considered adequate and the transfer must be permitted by
Member States?68 The European Commission have issued standard contractual clauses that fall
within the latter statute, and their incorporation into cloud contracts may enable access into the
lucrative European Digital Market. In a similar vein, this action could also apply to the function
of the African Union in providing an efficient economic function to Member States, whereby
standard contractual clauses can be designed for the purpose of cross border data transfers and
the facilitation of data-centric businesses in our emerging economy. This will go a long way in
maximizing returns for multinational companies and steering the economy in a positive manner.
The development of minimum standards in terms of anonymization and encryption in order to
enable data export from various jurisdictions within the African Union can be seen to be
fundamental to the development of cloud regulation and data protection within the Continent.
Data fragments stored in the cloud may not be 'personal data' in the provider's hands if the
provider is unable to read the fragments , although they would remain 'personal data ' as regards
the cloud user storing the data, who by logging into their account with the provider may reunite
the 'non-identifiable fragments thus enabling them accessing into their data's specific identity-
holder and function269. It seems then that in the event of strong encryption and/or anonymisation
rendering the data unidentifiable, the issue of data protection does not arise as the data cannot be
determined as personal. The implication of this policy will ultimately lead to sound data security
infrastructure by application developers and cloud providers as well as Privacy by Design, as a
norm and standard for enterprises in the technology space throughout the Continent.
268 Data Protection Directive, Article 26(4)




2. Lessons from the current data protection reform in the European Union:
In 2014, the European Commission identified numerous shortcomings present in the then data
protection regime, the very yardstick upon which the African Union's Convention on Personal
Data Protection and Cybercrime is based on. As such, it is essential to note the various measures
implemented by the forthcoming General Data Protection Regulation, intended to cull these
shortcomings. The latter include; fragmented dispute resolution mechanisms, the deficiency of
fundamental rights in data protection law, the bureaucratization of data protection law and the
immense need for reference to privacy in data protection.
The European Commission has published the following principles to act as overarching
guidelines in the drafting of the data protection regulations: these are the principles of
subsidiarity and proportionalityv'", as well as the protection of fundamental rights in data
usage271,
THE LEGAL PRINCIPLES GUIDING THE DRAFTING OF THE GENERAL DATA
PROTECTION REGULAnONS:
The drafting of the Regulations and the determination of their scope and applicability are firmly
founded upon .the following legal principles:
1. Subsidiarity and proportionality.
2. The protection of fundamental rights in data usage.
1. Subsidiarity & Proportionality:
According to the principle of subsidiarity (Article 5(3) TEU), action at the larger Union level
shall be taken only if and in so far as the objectives envisaged cannot be achieved sufficiently by
Member States, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better
270 Proposal for Regulation of The European Parliament and of The Council
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achieved by the Union. An apt analysis of the principle of subsidiarity indicates the necessity of
El.l-level action, which can be justified by the following grounds272.
The right to the protection of personal data, enshrined in Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights, requires the same level of data protection throughout the Union. The absence of common
rules creates the risk of different levels of protection in the Member States and create restrictions
on cross-border flows of personal data between Member States with different standards.i'"
Personal data are transferred across national boundaries, both internal and external borders, at
rapidly increasing rates. In addition, there are practical challenges to enforcing data protection
legislation and a need for co-operation between Member States and their authorities, which needs
to be organized at a larger level to ensure unity of application of Union law.274 The African
Union is also best placed to ensure effectively and consistently the same level of protection for
individuals when their personal data are transferred to third countries.
The European Union noted that its Member States could not alone reduce the problems in the
current data protection regime, particularly those due to the fragmentation in national
Iegislations.i'" Thus, there exists a specific need to establish a harmonized and coherent
framework allowing for a smooth transfer of personal data across borders within the EU while
ensuring effective protection for all individuals across the ED. In a similar vein, with the
proliferation of data usage across the African continent, there is a need for the unified effort of
States to guarantee the data integrity of various states.
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Legislative actions undertaken by the larger Union will be more effective than similar actions at
the level of Member States because of the nature and scale of the problems, which are not
confined to the level of one or several Member States .276
It is crucial to note that the principle of proportionality requires that any intervention is targeted
and does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives. This principle has guided the
preparation of the proposal from the identification and evaluation of alternative policy options to
the drafting of the legislative proposa1.277
2. The protection of fundamental rights in data usage:
The right to protection of personal data is established by Article 8 of the Charter and Article 16
TFEU and in Article 8 of the ECHR. As underlined by the Court ofJustice of the EU278, the right
to the protection of personal data is not an absolute right , but must be considered in relation to its
function in society279. Data protection is closely linked to respect for private and family life
protected by Article 7 of the Charter. This is reflected by Article 1(1) of Directive 95/46/EC
which provides that Member States shall protect fundamental rights and freedoms of natural
persons and in particular their right to privacy with respect of the processing of personal data.
Other potentially affected fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter are the following: freedom
of expressionv'"; freedom to conduct a businessi'"; the right to property and in particular the
protection of intellectual propertl82; the prohibition of any discrimination amongst others on
276 Proposal for Regulation of The European Parliament and of The Council
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on
the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation), p.17
277 Proposal for Regulation of The European Parliament and of The Council
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on
the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation), p.18
278Court of Justice of the EU,judgment of 9.11.2010, Joined Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker und
Markus Schecke and Eifert (2010) ECR 1-0000. .
279 ln line with Article 52(1) of the Charter, limitations may be imposed on the exercise of the right to data
protection as long as the limitations are provided for by law, respect the essence of the right and
freedoms and, subject to the principle of proportionality, are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of
general interest recognised by the European Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of
others.
280 Article 11 of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union
281 Article 16 of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union.








~" grounds such as race, ethnic origin, genetic features, religion or belief, political opinion or any
other opinion, disability or sexual orientatiorrf"; the rights of the child284; the right to a high level
of human health care285; the right of access to documentsf'''; the right to an effective remedy and
a fair trial287.
The incorporation of the protection of fundamental rights within the AU data protection regime
is imperative to the adoption of data protection measures within Member States' local
jurisdictions. The effect of such integration into local statutes is the improved enforceability of
Union data protection tenets and the prioritization of fundamental rights in software design,
creation and sale within the African digital market.
B. Conclusion:
The need for systematized data protection regulation is evident in Africa, and as the number of
cloud technologies grow, the ill-preparedness of African policymakers will continue to be a thorn
in the flesh for the development of multinational enterprises from their jurisdictions. Further,
inadequate data export restrictions may lead to their citizens ' fundamental rights being violated
for the benefit of economic success. The news however is not all that bleak. Currently, 14
African countries have privacy framework laws and some sort of data protection authorities in
place. Once the African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal data Protection
(Convention) is ratified across the continent, many other nations will likely enact personal data
protection laws. Moreover , as of 1/1/2016. seven African countries have data protection bills in
place: Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Niger , Nigeria, Tanzania, and Uganda. In addition, many
analysts believe that the Convention seeks to replicate the European Union data protection model
whereby each country has its own national data protection laws and authority. This evidences
that, African legislators are not oblivious of the threat that inadequate data protection legislation
poses, and the drafting of the Convention and its continued ratification and adoption continues to
spur positive growth in the data protection regime.
283 Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union .
284 Art icle 28 of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union .
285 Article 35 of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
286 Article 42 of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union.





Kenya, as the market leader in information technology products and services in Sub Saharan
Africa has a significant role to play in the integration of data protection in Africa's future. The
experiences brought by the creation of numerous cloud-based technologies within her
jurisdiction has put Kenyans on a pedestal as this market experience has enabled Kenyan policy
makers to develop more effective data protection strategies than her counterparts. The latter can
also be justified by the superior digital market, wherein the use of software products is
customary, market behaviours can easily be determined and harmful trends can be determined
and legislated against. The impending Data Protection Bill and the African Union 's Convention
on Personal Data Protection and Cybercrime may be our nation's first step towards unleashing





In conclusion, according to the constitutional principles asserted by the Justice Lenaola 1. in the
case of Benard Murage v. Fineserve Kenya & 4 others , the seeds of data protection regulation in
our nation can be based upon the rich constitutional tenets of privacy and consumer rights, whose
apt implementation within the emergent data protection regime could ultimately protect citizens
from the hazards of the bureaucratisation of data protection. The latter topic, as the Kenyan
jurisdiction is heavily invested in mobile technologies could be an interesting point for further
study, as the relationship between national data protection agencies and private mobile number
operators will determine the level of penetration and implementation on data protection








1. Millard Christopher; Cloud Computing Law, Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon
Street, Oxford, United Kingdom, 2013.
2. Lloyd J. Ian, Information Technology Law, Sixth Edition published in Oxford University
Press, Great Clarendon Street, United Kingdom, 2012.
3. Carey Peter with Bridget Treacy, Data Protection (A practical guide to the United
Kingdom and European Union Law), Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street,
United Kingdom, 2012.
4. Carey Peter, Data Protection Handbook, Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon
Street, United Kingdom, 2012.
5. Kuner Christopher, Transborder Data Flows and Data Privacy Law. Oxford University
Press, Great Clarendon Street, United Kingdom, 2013.
JOURNAL ARTICLES
1. Kuan Hon and Christopher Millard, Cloud Computing vs. Traditional Outsourcing-Key
Differences, Social Sciences Research Network (12/9/2012)
2. Simitis, 'Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society ', University of Pennsylvania Law
Rev, Vol. 135, No.3 (March , 1987)
3. 'The Census Decision', Human Rights Law JournalS (1984).
4. Datenschutzgestz 2000.
5. Opinion 0512012 on Cloud Computing, Article 29 Data Protection Working Party,
WP136
6. Legal Guidance, para. 3.1.7 .7. Available at
http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload!documents/library/data protection!detailed specialist gm
des/data protection act legal guidance.pdf
WEB SOURCES:
1. http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?g=cache:http://www.laits.utexas.edu/-nor
man!BUS.FOR/course.mat/Alex (University of Austin)
2. John Chambers' final key note address in Cisco Live 2015, asserted the numerous points
made in this paragraph. See video link as attached here.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ujBLgLFNrOs
3. http://www.vodafone.com/business/global-enterprise/invisible-infrastructure-the-rise-of-
africas-mobile-middle-class-2013-08-22) (Accessed on 5/11/2015)
4. http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2011/jul/24/mobile-phones-africa-microfinance-
farming










9. http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/dataprotection/Legal instruments en.asp














protection/detailed specialist guides/data protection act legal guidance. pdf
22. http://www.B4U.com
.L. LEGISLATION:
1. The United Kingdom Data Protection Act (1998)
2. The European Union Data Protection Directive (Directive 95/46/EC)
3. The Constitution of Kenya (2010)





5. The Kenya Information and Communications Act, Chapter 411A, (1998) Revised
Edition (2012)
6. The Central Bank of Kenya Act, Chapter 491, (2012), Revised Edition (2014)
2. TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS:
1. The Council of Europe 's Convention for the Protection of Individuals with
Regard to the Automatic Processing of Personal Data, Reference No. CETS
No.108.
2. Charter of the Fundamental Rights of The European Union (20001C 364/01)
3. The Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
Recommendation of the Council concerning Guidelines governing the Protection
of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (2013), [C(80)58/FINAL, as
amended on 11 July 2013 by C(2013)79].
4. The United Nations Guidelines for the Regulation of Computerized Personal Data
Files, Adopted by General Assembly resolution 45/95 of 14 December 1990
5. The African Union Convention on Cybersecurity and Personal Data Protection,
EX.CL/846(XXV)
112
I
·1
